



DZONE TREND REPORT

DECEMBER 2022

Enterprise Application Security

Building Secure and Resilient Applications

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Welcome Letter

By Melissa Habit, Senior Publications Manager at DZone

Imagine yourself in Venice, where you're seated in one of Italy's most famous opera houses, *Teatro La Fenice*. The stage is illuminated by warm lights that dance along a violinist's horsehair bow as they draw the opening note in E major of Antonio Vivaldi's "Le quattro stagioni."

Vivaldi's"The Four Seasons" is recognized as an organizational masterpiece that, at the time of its conception, was an innovative approach to musical composition: a group of four violin concerti ascribing melodic expression to every season of the year.

Each concerto depicts an individual story that builds upon the next, contributing to the overall narrative. Leading a performance in this style to create a seamless work of art requires attention to detail, collaboration, and a genuine connection between both the conductor and ensemble as well as among the musicians them selves.

Just as Vivaldi's composition revolutionized the classical genre, today's ifeldof software development is experiencing a dramatic shift (left) in how teams approach security in order to adapt to the changing threat landscape.

Vulnerabilities *are* inherent to the nature in which software is constructed, so an application's composers must consider security at all stages of the SDLC — they must implement security practices into each movement of their craft to create not only a stable, secure product, but also to ensure a harmonious experience for the audience.

In the same way a solo violinist can introduce sounds that alter the performance of "Summer's" ending as it transitions to "Autumn," with its swift, rising tempo, an individual developer can introduce vulnerabilities into a feature through the composition of their code.

However, it is not only about a developer's focus on the ifne elements. Importance also lies in the wider team's commitment to innovative security practices and collaboration. And like that of a conductor, one who listens carefully to their ensemble's tempo shifts, to their pitch and concerted motion, those managing security-focused groups can be attuned to their team's collective needs as well as security vulnerabilities — both present ones and instances yet to be discovered.

With that awareness comes the invaluable ability to remain lfexible and agile in an ever-evolving threat landscape.

As the last few years have certainly shown us, through the exponential acceleration of digital transformation and (most especially) changes in how and where we work, security should be the crux of any application, system, and organization. So to you, I ask, "Are you ready?"

On behalf of the entire DZone family, I'm pleased to welcome you to our ifnalTrend Report of 2022, *Enterprise Application Security: Building Secure and Resilient Applications*. Our research explores how security has permeated all facets of software development, from both the technical perspective and within team and organizational cultures.

We also worked with several members from the DZone community who have contributed their expert insights on practices such as handling security incidents, applying zero-trust principles, and building security into the software supply chain.

Our hope is for the information within to help you set the stage and tune your instruments for ultimately delivering a secure product and smooth experience to customers.

Rem em ber: The adventure is in the details, in the integrity of the production — of the performance itself. \bigotimes

Wishing you all the best,

multiplat

Melissa Habit

Key Research Findings

An Analysis of Results from DZone's Application Security Survey

By G. Ryan Spain, Freelance Software Engineer, Former Engineer & Editor at DZone

In November 2022, DZone surveyed software developers, architects, and other IT professionals in order to understand the state of application security.

Major research targets were:

- 1. Perceived/observed application security risks
- 2. Development and testing techniques for securing applications
- 3. The role security plays for individuals within an organization as well as the SDLC as a whole

Methods: We created a survey and distributed it to a global audience of software professionals. Question form ats included multiple choice, free response, and ranking. Survey links were distributed via em ail to an opt-in subscriber list, popups on DZone.com, the DZone Core Slack workspace, and various DZone social media channels. The survey was open from October 29–Novem ber 19, 2022 and recorded 535 com plete responses.

Demographics: Due to the variations in respondent demographics between this year's and last year's Application Security survey, we've noted audience details below:

- Only 6% of respondents described their prim ary role in their organization as "Developer/Engineer" (which was the largest category of respondents' roles last year at 35%). 25% of respondents said their prim ary role is "Technical Architect" (up from 20% in 2021), and 15% said their prim ary role is "Developer Team Lead" (down from 19% in 2021). Nearly one in ifve respondents (19%) said their prim ary role is "Site Reliability Engineer (SRE)" this year a substantial increase from the 2% seen in last year's survey.
- 2. Far few er respondents this year said they work on web applications/services (28%) than last year (77%). Most respondents for this year's survey said they work on enterprise business apps (62% in 2022 versus 45% in 2021); many also said that they work on boxed software, either with updates over the web (39% in 2022 versus 11% in 2021) or without web updates (25% in 2022 versus 9% in 2021).
- 3. Java was a much less popular language for respondents of this year's survey only 17% of respondents said their com pany uses a Java ecosystem, com pared to 75% last year. Client-side JavaScript this year's most used language at 42% was still lower than 2021's 62% response. C#, Node js, Python, PHP, Scala, and TypeScript all had significantly lower results than last year. The only language with a statistically significant increase this year was Ruby (15% in 2022 versus 11% in 2021).
- 4. Regarding responses on the *prim ary* language respondents use at work, last year, Java dominated the results at 52%, with Python (10%), C# (7%), and server-side JavaScript (6%) being the only other languages over 5%. This year, however, there is much greater variation in prim ary languages. Server-side JavaScript and C/C++ tied for the largest segments at 19% each, followed by client-side JavaScript (14%), Java (13%), C# (11%), Go (8%), and Kotlin (7%).
- 5. Generally, respondents this year had fewer years of experience as a software professional, with an average of 7.1 years of experience and a median of 5 years, compared to last year's average of 13.2 years and median of 12 years.
- 6. Respondents worked at generally smaller shops this year compared to last year, with more than 90% working at companies with less than 1,000 employees. Last year, 21% of respondents said they worked at companies between 1,000 and 10,000 employees, and 29% said they worked at companies with more than 10,000 employees.

In this report, we review some of our key research ifndings. Many secondary ifndings of interest are not included here.

Research Target One: Application Security Risks

Motivations:

- 1. Application security is deifned by risk; creating a secure application means ifrst understanding the potential threats that application faces. To that end, we wanted to determine which risks software professionals perceived as most problem atic. We looked to OWASP's Top 10 Web Application Security Risks from 2021 to gauge how the vulnerabilities perceived by our respondents compared to the results of OWASP's security tests.
- 2. Security risks don't really present problems until an application is put into production. Code on the dev branch can still be ifxed before making it to main; code in the pipeline can have vulnerabilities patched before that code is deployed. While in practice security should generally be a consideration before the last possible moment, the consequences of poor security don't manifest until an application is made available to the user. In our survey, we wanted to ifnd out how often security issues made it through development and into the "real world."

COMPARISON TO OWASP TOP 10 WEB APPLICATION SECURITY RISKS

Every few years, the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) creates a top 10 list of application security risks, combining analysis of application data and a survey of industry professionals to note the most observed security issues in the web application space.

As described on their website: "The OWASP Top 10 is a standard awareness document for developers and web application security. It represents a broad consensus about the most critical security risks to web applications." We asked our respondents to rank each security risk in OWASP's Top 10 list by how problem atic they found each risk:

In 2021, OWASP surveyed and identiifed the top security risks to web applications. Based on your experiences, please rank the following web application security risks in order of most problematic (top) to least problematic (bottom) for you and/or your organization:

Results:

Table 1

WEB APPLICATION SECURITY RISK RANKINGS							
Risk	Rank	Score	n=				
Broken access control	1	2,835	4 19				
Identiifcation and authentication failures	2	2,621	442				
In secure software design	3	2,570	434				
Vulnerable and outdated components	4	2,497	4 19				
Injection	5	2,458	438				
Logging and monitoring failures	6	2,4 19	427				
Security misconifguration	7	2,295	421				
Cryptographic failures	8	2,240	426				
Software and data integrity failures	9	2,208	423				
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)	10	1,936	4 17				

Observations:

1. Broken access control - number 1 on OWASP's Top 10 Web App Security Risks in 2021 - also presents the biggest issue for respondents.

OWASP's number 1spot in 2021 went to "broken access control," up from a middling position (#5) in 2017's report. Vulnerabilities under the umbrella of broken access control, according to the OWASP description, include: not following the "Principle of Least Privilege" or the "Deny by Default Principle"; accessing APIs with missing functionlevel access controls; improper privilege elevation; and manipulation of exposed metadata.

Our survey respondents, on average, also found broken access control to be the most problematic security risk of the 10, with the risk receiving the highest-ranking score of all the options available. According to OWASP's 2021report, 24% of respondents ranked broken access control at number 1, beating OWASP's next-most number 1 rated risk, cryptographic failures, by 8%.

Perhaps relatedly, following the practice of the "principle of lowest possible privilege" was ranked second to lowest among 14 secure coding techniques in another question asked of our respondents, which we will address later in these research ifndings.

2. Identiifcation/authentication failures and vulnerable/outdated components are ranked more problem atic by our respondents than OWASP data indicates.

Identiifcation and authentication failures — then referred to as "broken authentication" — ranked number 2 in OWASP's previous top 10 report, from 2017. That category fell to the number 7 spot in 2021. According to OWASP: "This category is still an integral part of the Top 10, but the increased availability of standardized fram eworks seems to be helping." Vulnerable and outdated components — previously "using components with known vulnerabilities" — actually moved up in OWASP's rankings in 2021, reaching number 6 in the list from 2017's number 9 ranking.

Both of these risks, however, were deemed to be more problematic by our survey respondents than seen in the OWASP list. Identiifcation and authentication failures appeared at number 2 in our rankings, and vulnerable and outdated components came in at number 4.41% of respondents ranked identiifcation and authentication failures in their top three most problematic risks. And while almost no one ranked vulnerable and outdated components as the number 1 most problematic risk (only 2%), 40% ranked it second (11%), third (15%), or fourth (14%).

3. Cryptographic failures and injection are ranked less problem atic by our respondents than OWASP data indicates.

Cryptographic failures ranked number 2 overall in OWASP's 2021top ten list, and injection — which was the number 1 spot of OWASP's 2017 list — ranked number 3 for OWASP in 2021. Cross-site scripting (XSS), form erly making up its own risk category in the 2017 OWASP list, was in 2021added to the "injection" category.

For DZone respondents, these categories both ranked as less problem atic risks. Cryptographic failures, while being the second most common risk ranked in the number 1spot (16% of respondents placed it highest on the list), overall ranked in eighth place. 26% of respondents ranked cryptographic failures last (16%) or next to last (10%). Injection came in iffth place in our survey rankings, and also saw an inverted bell curve in its results: 27% of respondents ranked in jection ifrst (15%) or second (12%), while 23% ranked it as last (15%) or next-to-last (8%).

VULNERABILITIES AFTER RELEASE

Like any other software bug, security issues are inevitable. Software is created by humans, and humans are imperfect, ergo software will be imperfect. What can be better controlled is where in the SDLC these security issues are discovered and rectified. Part of the SDLC — as well as the entire concept behind shift-left security — is to ensure that security issues don't make it to production code.

We wanted to see, how ever, how many security vulnerabilities were making it out of the development stage and actually being released to production. So we asked our respondents:


What percent of your releases introduce at least one security issue?

And:

How often do you release code that you are not conifdent is secure?

Results:

SEE FIGURE 1ON NEXT PAGE



HOW OFTEN PERCEIVED INSECURE CODE IS RELEASED

Observations:

 Even by the estimates of those writing and deploying code, few releases occur without some potential security risk. While many respondents (41%) feel they rarely release code they are not conifdent is secure, only 12% feel they never do this. Almost half of respondents (45%) feel that they release code they are not conifdent is secure sometimes (23%), often (18%), or all the time (4%). 3% of respondents answered that they did not know.

Though these conifdence levels do not specifically correlate to code vulnerabilities, they do help to paint the picture of application security's uncertain nature. The growing complexity of software design and development make it more and more difficult to pick out security risks among thousands of objects, functions, API calls, services, libraries, etc. The ram iffcations of this difficulty can be seen when looking at how rarely software is released without introducing new security issues.

Only 2% of respondents (of 268 respondents answering, "What percent of your releases introduce at least one security issue?") said that none of their releases introduced any security issues, and only 12% of respondents estimated this to be less than 10%. On average, respondents claimed that 20% of releases introduced at least one security issue, with a median response of 13%.

Respondents at the largest organizations (10,000+) had a lower estimate than most with regards to releases introducing security issues; those respondents, on average, said that 17% of releases introduced at least one security issue, with a median response of 5% (although the n value for this was quite low, with n = 17).

Research Target Two: The Role of AppSec in the SDLC and for the Developer

Motivations:

 An application's development and deployment are made up of the efforts of individual software professionals; nothing gets coded, tested, built, released — or secured — without *som eone* taking the responsibility for coding, testing, building, releasing, securing. But of course, these responsibilities vary by individual, and they are taken on for a variety of reasons, both internal and external to the individual (or even the organization).

We wanted to see where respondents thought their organization put the onus of application security, as well as the factors impacting their own security decisions.

2. As mentioned previously, the concept of shift-left security is aim ed at reducing security vulnerabilities that make it to production releases, seeking to ifnd and remedy issues earlier in the development process. The shift-left mentality makes sense when viewing the SDLC holistically or hypothetically, but in practice, it could put extra strain on developers and lead to difficult decisions regarding priorities (If a developer must add security considerations to their own worklfow, what considerations must they cut back on? Does perform ance take a hit? Stability? Time to release?).

We tried to ifnd out where in the SDLC organizations began implementing security, and whether respondents thought certain security considerations were occurring too early or too late in the SDLC.


INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY AND FACTORS INFLUENCING SECURITY DECISIONS

Where individual responsibility lies in application development isn't always completely straightforward. Multiple people are often involved with the same code, and details regarding which individual has primary responsibility for an application's security may not be said outright. To ifnd out whether respondents believed their organization placed responsibility for security on the respondents' shoulders, we asked:

In your employer's judgment, you are personally responsible for the security of any application you work on.

Results:

Figure 2



PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR APPLICATION SECURITY

We also sought to ifnd what forces inlfuenced the respondents' own security decisions, asking:

How much impact do the following have on your application security decisions? Rank from greatest impact (top) to least impact (bottom).

Results are noted in Table 2.

Observations:

 Respondents mostly believed that their employers consider them personally responsible for the security of the applications they work on, whether that responsibility lies with the respondent only for the code they write (27%) or for the application as a whole (37%).

> Still, m any m ore respondents believe that their employers don't consider them responsible for the security of the applications they work on at all, with 34% of respondents answering "False" to the question compared to only 8% last year. This change may correlate som ewhat with the 15% increase in respondents saying that their organization employs specialists in application security (up to 79% this year from 64% in 2021).

> In future research, we may be able to determine if this correlation holds, and can determine whether respondents' own opinions

Table 2

FACTORS IMPACTING APPLICATION SECURITY DECISIONS

Factor	Rank	Score	n=
Regulatory requirem ents	1	2,853	409
An actual breach at your organization	2	2,598	4 18
Security aw areness organizations (OWASP, SANS, etc.)	3	2,581	432
Custom er requirem ents	4	2,519	4 12
Actual breaches at other organizations	5	2,4 18	429
Dem and s from investors	6	2,328	406
Demands from executives	7	2,241	4 13
Security m akes our software m ore m arketable	8	2,132	4 17
Users tell us about vulnerabilities in our software	9	1,986	430
Other	10	1,8 11	397

of their responsibility regarding application security aligns with their perception of their employers' position, or determine in what ways those opinions differ.

- 2. Like last year, regulatory requirements ranked as the most impactful factor inlfuencing security decisions by a fairly wide margin. 18% of respondents rated regulatory requirements at number 1, while 50% of respondents ranked this option in their top three factors. This is perhaps a hopeful consistency, as it may mean that regulatory requirements are keeping up with threats as they emerge.
- 3. Our 2021Application Security survey placed "an actual breach at your organization" at number 4 in the rankings list, and the option scored closely with software marketability and actual breaches at other organizations. This year, however, actual breaches at the respondents' organizations ranked number two, surpassing security awareness orgs like OWASP and customer requirements (numbers 2 and 3 in last year's rankings).

This gives reason to believe that increasing complexity of security practices and development processes as a whole, or perhaps just an increasing number of security threats in general, have caused ifrst-hand security breaches to become a wider experience for more developers.


SECURITY'S PLACE IN THE SDLC

Leaving security as an afterthought in application development can be detrimental and cause security vulnerabilities to slip through to production code. Focusing on security too much too early may cause development time to increase, or it may require unnecessary resources to be added to a project or siphoned from somewhere else. To determine where in the SDLC organizations begin their application security considerations, we asked respondents:

At what stage in the SDLC does your organization ifrst implement security?

Results:

Figure 3



STAGE OF SDLC WHERE SECURITY IS FIRST IMPLEMENTED

In order to see how important respondents ifnd security compared to other application development considerations, we asked:

In reality, how important are each of the following considerations? Rank from most important (top) to least important (bottom).

Results are detailed in Table 3.

Observations: We also wanted to determ in e software professionals' feelings on the shift-left security mindset. We asked our respondents' opinions on when they thought their organizations *should* explicitly consider security compared to where they typically see it now, as well as where they thought their organization *should* perform pen testing, fuzz testing, and static code analysis compared to when they actually perform these tests:

Table 3


IMPORTANCE OF APP DEVELOPMENT CONSIDERATIONS

ltem	Rank	Score	n=
Security	1	1,730	432
Maintainability	2	1,674	431
Perform ance	3	1,575	421
Technical aesthetics (of architecture, design, code itself)	4	1,448	420
Scalability	5	1,394	427
User experience	6	1,265	408

In your opinion, security should explicitly be considered:

Results:

Figure 4




WHERE TO CONSIDER SECURITY IN THE SDLC

In your opinion, your organization should perform :

Results:

Figure 5



PREFERENCES FOR AMOUNT OF PENETRATION TESTING

FIGURES 6 AND 7 CONTINUE ON NEXT PAGE

PREFERENCES FOR AMOUNT OF FUZZ TESTING





Figure 7



PREFERENCES FOR AMOUNT OF STATIC CODE ANALYSIS

Observations:

- Most respondents ifnd that their organization ifrst im plements security in the developm ent/coding stage or earlier, rather than leaving security considerations to testing, integration, or maintenance. 10% of respondents say their org ifrst im plements security during the planning/analysis stage, 22% during the design stage, and 39% during the developm ent/ coding stage.
- 2. Security ranked highest when respondents were asked how important various considerations were in their software development over second-place maintainability and third-place performance. This deviates from last year's results, where respondents answered that security should be the most important consideration *in an ideal world*. But in reality, respondents ranked user experience and performance ifrst and second place, respectively, above third-place security. This newly placed importance on security could be correlated to the increase in ifrst-hand security breaches that organizations experienced, as mentioned earlier.
- 3. More than one-third of respondents believe that security should be explicitly considered later in the SDLC than they typically see it (42%) and believe that their organization should perform less penetration testing (38%), fuzz testing (42%), and static code analysis (37%).

These results differ wildly from last year's survey, where 66% of respondents said that they believed security should be considered earlier in the SDLC than they typically see it (compared to 31% this year), and only 10% of respondents thought it should be considered later in the SDLC. And respondents last year mainly thought their organization should perform more penetration testing (62%), fuzz testing (52%), and static code analysis (58%), rather than less (6% for pen testing, 10% for fuzz testing, and 9% for static code analysis).

It is possible that an increased focus on security and stricter security measures throughout the SDLC have caused frustration for many software professionals, who must now adapt their worklfows around new and changing security-focused business requirements. Future research may be able to further elucidate the reasons behind this push back against the leftwards shift of security concerns in the SDLC.

Research Target Three: Security-Aimed Development and Testing Techniques

Motivations:

- The ever-changing nature of the application development landscape tools, techniques, practices, methodologies, etc.
 brings change as well to the security risks those applications may encounter. Advancements in security necessitate new threats, which in turn require updated security techniques, and so on, ad inifnitum. We wanted to see what changes to security techniques and architectural patterns we could ifnd compared to last year's Application Security survey.
- 2. The integration of processes into DevOps pipelines is critical in much of modern enterprise development for maintaining quality control and facilitating smooth deployments. Automation of the processes necessary to release stable and safe software reduces the chance of human error and allows for testing at otherwise unreachable scales and speeds. We wanted to know how organizations were implementing security-related tools and tests into their DevOps pipeline.
- 3. How often to scan for security vulnerabilities varies from application to application, and "best practices" regarding scanning frequency depends on who you ask. How quickly vulnerabilities can be remedied once identiifed can also vary wildly, taking anywhere from hours to months. We tried to ifnd out how often organizations were performing these scans, and how quick their turnaround time was once a vulnerability was found.

CHANGES IN TECHNIQUES AND PATTERNS

As software development becomes, in general, more complex, and as threats evolve to try to outpace security precautions, techniques and patterns used to create more secure software must adapt. In order to understand how techniques and patterns have changed (and, in some instances, how software professionals' feelings about those techniques and patterns have changed), we compared answers between the 2021 and 2022 survey responses for the following questions:

How often have you seen good implementations of each of the following application security architectural patterns?

Results:

Table 4

GOOD IMPLEMENTATIONS OF APPLICATION SECURITY ARCHITECTURAL PATTERNS. 2021VS. 2022										
	Of	Often		Sometimes		Rarely		Never		=
Pattern	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022
Single access point	62.0%	17.1%	27.9%	60.0%	7.0%	16.9%	3.0%	6.0%	469	515
Check point	45.8%	21.9%	37.3%	39.9%	13.3%	32.2%	3.6%	6.0%	467	521
Security roles	57.3%	18.2%	32.5%	42.5%	8.1%	30.3%	2.1%	9.0%	468	522
Explicit sessions	29.4%	11.5%	32.0%	47.4%	27.9%	25.6%	10.7%	15.5%	459	523
Error messaging over hiding	30.8%	13.0%	32.5%	42.6%	24.4%	26.8%	12.2%	7.6%	467	524
Hiding over error messaging	45.5%	14.6%	31.7%	51.2%	15.3%	23.3%	7.4%	10.9%	470	514
Secure access layer	50.6%	17.8%	32.4%	41.8%	11.8 %	31.2%	5.2%	9.2%	466	522

GOOD IMPLEMENTATIONS OF APPLICATION SECURITY ARCHITECTURAL PATTERNS: 2021vs. 2022

How often have you seen **bad** implementations of each of the following application security architectural patterns?

Results:

SEE TABLE 5 ON NEXT PAGE

Table 5

BAD IMPLEMENTATIONS OF APPLICATION SECURITY ARCHITECTURAL PATTERNS: 2021vs. 2022

	Often		Sometimes		Rarely		Never		n=	
Pattern	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022
Single access point	25.5%	15.3%	39.1%	51.5%	26.6%	26.0%	8.8%	7.2%	466	515
Check point	21.3%	15.6%	43.7%	35.5%	25.2%	4 1.3%	9.9%	7.6%	465	513
Security roles	24.6%	16.2%	38.4%	43.1%	27.2%	30.8%	9.9%	10.0%	464	520
Explicit sessions	22.7%	16.1%	38.1%	43.9%	26.8%	30.8%	12.4%	9.2%	467	522
Error messaging over hiding	27.0%	15.0%	38.7%	49.5%	24.8%	26.5%	9.6%	9.0%	460	521
Hiding over error messaging	22.0%	11.7%	40.9%	49.2%	26.5%	31.5%	10.6%	7.5%	464	520
Secure access layer	25.4%	12.1%	37.0%	42.3%	26.3%	33.7%	11.3%	11.9%	460	520

How often do you use the following secure coding techniques? Rank from most commonly used (top) to least commonly used (bottom).

Results:

Table 6

SECURE CODING TECHNIQUE RANKINGS: 2021							
Technique	Rank	Score	n=				
Input validation	1	4,648	402				
Secure coding standards	2	3,714	393				
Data sanitization: input	3	3,626	384				
Deliberate architecture and design sessions for security	4	3,532	372				
Principle of lowest possible privilege	5	3,382	367				
Whitelisting (permission explicit, denial default)	6	3,225	371				
Static code analysis for security	7	3,040	382				
Simple design to shrink attack surface	8	2,943	349				
Data sanitization: output	9	2,599	345				
Penetration testing	10	2,454	359				
Policy of ignoring no compiler warnings	11	2,348	332				
Threat modeling	12	2,093	320				
Defense in depth	13	2,052	321				
Fuzz testing	14	1,4 38	300				

SEE TABLE 7 ON NEXT PAGE

Table 7

SECURE CODING TECHNIQUE RANKINGS: 2022

Technique	Rank	Score	n=				
Policy of ignoring no compiler warnings	1	3,933	423				
Input validation	2	3,921	4 16				
Static code analysis for security	3	3,810	425				
Deliberate architecture and design sessions for security	4	3,509	424				
Secure coding standards	5	3,336	4 19				
Data sanitization: input	6	3,136	420				
Penetration testing	7	3,020	4 13				
Data sanitization: output	8	3,0 11	427				
Whitelisting (permission explicit, denial default)	9	3,009	430				
Defense in depth	10	2,984	4 17				
Threat modeling	11	2,850	408				
Simple design to shrink attack surface	12	2,805	4 14				
Principle of lowest possible privilege	13	2,791	4 18				
Fuzz testing	14	2,778	4 14				

Observations:

1. In general, respondents of this year's survey were considerably less likely to answer "Often" or "Never," instead choosing "Som etim es" or "Rarely" when these answer choices were given.

This could be indicative of an increased uncertainty around security practices, or a hesitance to subscribe to absolute beliefs as threats seem ingly grow more and more possible in one's own application. It could be a side effect of the ifckle nature of securing software. Or it could just be a quirk in the samples between the two years, given differences in respondent demographics. Further research is necessary to make a sounder judgment on the reason(s) behind this difference.

Note: Because of this variation, results in this section with Often/Som etimes/Rarely/Never answer choices will be compared aggregating "generally positive" results (often and som etimes) with "generally negative" results (rarely and never).

2. There seems to be much less conifdence in "good" implementations of security architectural patterns.

Last year, 90% of respondents either som etimes or often saw good implementations of "Single access point" and "Security roles" patterns, compared to 77% and 61%, this year, respectively. "Secure access layer" had 23% few er "often" or "som etim es" answers this year, and "Check point" dropped 21% this year. The only choice that did not fall a significant amount since last year was "Explicit session," which only fell 2%. Still, a majority of respondents said they found good implementations of all given patterns either som etimes or often rather than rarely or never.

This year's results for "bad" im plem entations of security architectural patterns were much more in line with last year's. "Single access point," "Explicit sessions," "Error messaging over hiding," and "Hiding over error messaging" saw less than a 3% change in respondents saying they had seen bad im plem entations of these patterns either often or som etimes, within our margin of error for this sam ple. "Security roles" had 4% fewer respondents observing bad uses of this pattern often or som etimes, while "Secure access layer" had 8% fewer and "Check point" 14% fewer, so the few patterns that did see year-over-year change saw overall fewer bad im plem entations than last year.

3. "Policy of ignoring no compiler warnings" jumped from an 11th place ranking in 2021 to ifrst place in secure coding techniques in 2022, just beating out last year's number-one spot, "Input validation." Also with rankings several spots higher this year, "Static code analysis" climbed from seventh to third place; "Penetration testing" went from 10th to seventh place; and "Defense in depth" moved from 13th to 10th place.

- 4. As mentioned, "Input validation" dropped from the top of the list to number 2 since last year, though the ranking scores between ifrst and second place this year were within about 0.3%. While 50% of respondents this year ranked input validation in their top three (as opposed to ignoring no compiler warnings at 41%), 12% of respondents put input validation last, lowering its score.
- 5. "Principle of lowest possible privilege" had the biggest drop in rank from last year, falling from iffth place in 2021to 13th place — next to last — in 2022. Other techniques that fell signifcantly in rank were: "Simple design to shrink attack surface," moving from 8th to 12th place; "Whitelisting," going from sixth to ninth place; "Secure coding standards," dropping from second to iffth place; and "Data sanitization," going from third to sixth place.
- 6. The reasons for these changes in technique usage could be many. Some techniques may have proven more effective than others and increased in popularity. It is possible that some of these techniques have become more automated and are taking less collective space in software professionals' minds. Or considering the differences in demographics between surveys, certain techniques may be better suited to certain industries, or they are implemented more or less obviously in certain languages. Future research may help to determine what is impacting the adoption of these techniques.


TOOLS AND TESTS IN THE DEVOPS PIPELINE

To ifnd out how organizations are utilizing their DevOps pipeline for application security, we asked:

Which of the following security tools/tests are integrated into your DevOps pipeline?

Results:

Figure 8



TOOLS AND TESTS INTEGRATED INTO DEVOPS PIPELINES

Observations:

1. Production-probing services (such as "Chaos monkey") are currently the most popular tools integrated into DevOps pipelines — more than half of respondents (55%) said their pipelines have "Chaos monkey" or som ething similar. In 2021, only 27% of respondents said their DevOps pipelines had this type of tool. The nature of chaos engineering in general makes it a prime candidate for DevOps integration; these tools work by running constantly and random ly on production servers, and the computer automation required to make this work goes hand in hand with DevOps pipeline automation.

Dynamic application security (44%) and dependency analysis against CVE lists (37%) were the next most popular tools/ tests in DevOps pipeline integrations.

2. Besides Chaos-monkey-like probes, all options received a lower percentage of responses this year than last year. In particular, static application security testing, last year's most popular response at 75%, had only 27% this year.


FREQUENCY OF SCANNING AND TURNAROUND TIME FOR ADDRESSING CVEs

Scanning applications for vulnerabilities is vital to keeping software secure. New threats are constantly being identiifed, and reliance on third-party libraries and services means that breaches don't have to come from your application's code. To see how often organizations are scanning their applications, we asked:

How often is your organization scanning applications to detect and identify vulnerabilities?

Results:

Figure 9




FREQUENCY OF APPLICATION VULNERABILITY SCANNING

We also wanted to see what kind of turnaround time organizations were achieving once common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) were identiifed. We asked respondents:

What was the standard turnaround time for addressing CVEs?

Results:

Figure 10



STANDARD TURNAROUND TIME TO ADDRESS CVEs

Observations:

 Most respondents said their organization scans for vulnerabilities at least once a month. 30% said their scans occur monthly, 23% said they occur weekly, and 11% said they occur daily. Only 19% said that these scans occur once per quarter, and just 9% said they occur once a year. 2. Most organizations are able to address CVEs in either days (39%) or weeks (45%). Very few respondents said that their standard turnaround for addressing CVEs took only hours (9%) or took months (8%). Given the severity of many security vulnerabilities, these turnaround times overall seem slower than one might hope or expect.

However, this question does not take severity into account, which could have significant impact on how long it takes to address a CVE (one would imagine that a critical vulnerability, or one known to actively be exploited, would take less time to address than a non-critical issue). Still, even vulnerabilities seen as non-critical could be one exploit away from becoming a critical one.

Future Research

There's still much more to analyze from our survey results and plenty of opportunity to reifne and expand our Application Security survey in the coming years. Some topics we didn't get to in this report, but were incorporated in our survey, include:

- Writing application code to verify message integrity
- Securing legacy code vs. new code
- · Reliance on third parties to maintain secure code
- Service level agreements to address common vulnerabilities and exposures
- Techniques for detecting intrusion attempts
- Using custom HTTP headers for sender veriifcation

Please contact publications@dzone.com if you would like to discuss any of our ifndings or supplementary data.



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he can often be found watching reruns of Star Trek: The Next Generation with a glass of red wine or a cold beer.

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Cloud Multi-Tenants: 5 New Security Headaches in Store for DevOps

By Dotan Nahum, Head of Developer-First Security at Check Point

As cloud multi-tenancy increases, so do the security concerns for DevOps teams. To address these new security headaches, DevOps teams must proactively implement effective security measures and regularly review and update them to protect sensitive data.

Security Headache #1: Secure Access Controls

The complexity of managing access controls can create additional security overhead, increasing the risk of security incidents. Here are a few ways to increase access controls for cloud multi-tenancy:

- Implement strict authentication policies using rolebased access control so that only authorized users can access sensitive data and resources.
- Implement network segmentation and access controls to isolate sensitive data and resources, preventing unauthorized access between different tenants and networks and limiting lateral movement within the network.
- Monitor and audit access to ensure that controls are being properly enforced and unauthorized access is detected and prevented. By using scanning tools, you can autom ate this process and ensure that the system remains secure.

Security Headache #2: Data Isolation

Data isolation is a problem for cloud multi-tenancy because it is dififcult to make sure the data belonging to one tenant is not accessible by other tenants sharing the same physical infrastructure. Here's how to increase data isolation:

- Use virtual machines and containers to create isolated environments for each tenant and ensure it cannot be accessed without proper authorization.
- Use encryption to protect sensitive data in transit and at rest and to prevent unauthorized access to data, even if it is intercepted or stolen.

Security Headache #3: Data Protection

A lack of data protection can lead to data breaches and other security incidents, which can have serious legal and reputational consequences, as well as violate data protection laws and regulations for both the cloud provider and the affected tenants. So how can you increase data protection in a cloud multi-tenancy environment?

- Conduct regular security assessments and penetration tests to identify and address cloud infrastructure and application vulnerabilities.
- Develop and implement robust disaster recovery and business continuity plans to ensure your business can continue operating in the event of a security incident and recover quickly.

Security Headache #4: Audit Logs

Not every company has the resources and expertise to effectively manage and analyze their audit logs, but it can be achieved by following these steps:

- Implement a centralized logging system to collect and store audit logs from all systems and applications.
- Use autom ated tools to monitor and analyze audit logs in real time, identifying potential security issues, such as unauthorized access or suspicious activity, and alerting security teams to take action.
- Regularly review and analyze audit logs to identify trends and patterns that may indicate security issues.

Security Headache #5: Resource Utilization

Resource utilization can impact shared infrastructure performance and reliability, creating vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit. Here's how to manage resource utilization in a cloud multi-tenancy environment:

- □ Use monitoring and management tools to track resource utilization in real time and identify potential issues; this enables corrective action to be taken.
- Implement resource allocation and policies, such as setting limits on the number of resources that each tenant can use and ensuring resources are shared fairly between tenants.
- Use autom ation and orchestration tools to manage and optimize resource allocation and utilization so tenants are able to access the resources they need when they need them.

You can get a checklist here to help your team ensure that your vulnerable spots are secured.

DevSecOps Easter Eggs

Unearth Your Security Wins

By Julie Tsai, Cybersecurity Leader, Board Member, & Investor/Advisor

Security can often feel like a Sisyphean endeavor. Day after day, we roll what feels like a growing pile of rocks up the hill, building resilience from threats, internal weaknesses, resourcing challenges, hostile politics, hubris, laziness, inertia. Sifting through potentially overwhelming issues — as well as *too many tools* — is a steady discipline cybersecurity professionals must master. Not to mention the accumulated fatigue that can cause you to gloss over the details and daily doings.

But some of the deepest, most important wins can happen when you cut through the noise, get down to what matters, and consider daily routines with more attention and purpose. It's not a new line item on the budget or a new unicorn hire. Instead, it requires focus and a relatively small investment of time to reconsider and refactor regular routines, and this can pay big dividends. Often, the most critical security holes are opened during regular coding, building, and deploying.

Perfection is impossible, but putting care and attention into the work *is* possible. That's where we should aim. Being aware of the blind spots in an organization (and people) can go a long way toward defending against the unknowns. But where to start?

What Is DevSecOps and Why Does It Matter

DevSecOps is an evolution from DevOps — the idea of integrating core principles of development and operations teams into each other's practices and toolsets. In that process of incorporating a developer mindset into operations, as well as an operations mindset into development, security must not be forgotten. The joke: "DevOps is when you give the root keys to the developer" is dark hum or for security professionals who have seen many interpretations of DevOps agility where security and resilience are forgotten or an afterthought. Truly excellent DevOps means that security is *integrated* into DevOps from the beginning, not deprioritized in order to conduct more insecure, unstable projects faster. The art is accomplishing this without sacriifcing agility and lfexibility.

Because there are num erous ways companies can implement DevOps, it often feels like taking a Rorschach test — where the type of implementation is an answer that illustrates how the company views the importance of operations fundamentals relative to development. For example, of the many deifnitions for DevOps, DevSecOps can be realized as an extension of the core deifnitions of DevOps.

What DevSecOps Isn't

Just as importantly, what *isn't* DevSecOps? DevSecOps is not just deployment (or a secure deployment). A lot goes into producing secure code before and after it gets to production, meaning the code becomes accessible to the customer. Ask yourself:

- 1. Is the build itself code and conifgurations secure?
- 2. What new access is needed to services and have those been secured?
- 3. What pathways will critical data take, and what can access that data?

Likewise, a lot happens after code goes to production. During this stage, ask your teams:

- 1. What changes as applications run and build up load and stress?
- 2. Does that change the security of the application?
- 3. What attack vectors are most common?
- 4. What does the code depend on to run reliably and securely?

Deployment is a critical gate — one of the most important ones — but it's merely one step in the lifecycle of a project. The whole journey must be looked at, including what is picked up along the way in terms of data and access, and what is potentially lost.

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DevSecOps and Its Easter Eggs

DevSecOps is a value stream of integrating security needs into the tools that engineers use to build and deploy. Within that, there is a wealth of opportunities (or landmines) to do things securely and efficiently. Or its reverse. As it is a fundamental virtue of technology for the tech to be independent of the policy, any tool can be used for good or for ill. It all depends on the practitioner and the care with which it is handled.

In the following section, we will hunt the ifve main DevSecOps Easter eggs. Easter eggs in this context refer to a hidden joke or treasure often found in video games which rewards the user as an insider. The reward for the Easter egg hunter is foiling potential security attackers.

1. SECRETS, PASSWORDS, AND CREDENTIALS: HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT

One doesn't need to look far for major public breaches to see why this is important, e.g., hardcoded passwords and tokens in Travis CI or an Uber developer's private GitHub repo containing credentials to critical company apps and data that led to 57 million user and driver account compromises — and major regulatory and legal impacts. So what Easter eggs should we look for when it comes to passwords and credentials? You don't want credentials hiding in the following places, so take this opportunity to ifx major vulnerabilities.

- 1. Hardcoded passwords and tokens-these must go in a secured password manager or use a standard, hardened authentication/authorization system
- 2. Files on systems this consists of ownerships and application access
- 3. Shared credentials and keys
- 4. Credentials and keys stored in source control
- 5. **Credentials loaded in app or memory** this includes credentials that may be deifned in environmental variables, as well as those in applications that are left running indeifnitely and broadly accessible
- 6. Unchanged default credentials this can be vendor or institutional
- 7. Weak credentials this is vendor as well as core system credentials

2. HOW WIDE IS YOUR CIRCLE OF TRUST?

For critical information or operations like deployments or permissions changes, *do you know everybody who can touch or access production to deploy or change key permissions/creds*? *Do you know every app*? (See previous section on passwords and credentials stored in running instances or environments.) Tools developed to create no-friction deployment have made it hard to maintain cross-department visibility over tim e.

We have to get rid of that old canard "security by obscurity," especially with regard to this last point. Obscurity is not security — vulnerabilities have lifetime exposure: the attacker who can lie in wait has the luxury of time for reconnaissance. The attacker who knows your weaknesses and habits very well has their pick of what to exploit and when. And it is foolish hubris to assume that outsiders would have a harder time understanding or exploiting your systems than insiders. Outsiders often have the advantage of fresh eyes and sharpened toolkits to exploit common mistakes, even those made by smart people. Don't make it easy for an enemy to gain insight on you.

3. YOUR GOLD REPO SOURCE(S) OF TRUTH

Your source control repository should be considered your crown jewels: Not only is your intellectual property there, but your coding patterns, architectural insights, and occasionally (unfortunately) critical data resides there as well. Some key questions to ask regarding how well your repositories are being guarded and maintained include:

- 1. How are you securing your software?
- 2. Do you have known vetted repos?
- 3. Do you trust these?
- 4. How are they maintained?
- 5. What software is allowed to be on there?
- 6. Do you have a Bill of Materials?
- 7. Can you guarantee its secure provenance its history and pathway?

It is a behemoth to be considered, but you get a lot of bang for the buck in securing code repositories and the pathways in and out of there. This gives not only a good DevOps architectural view but also provides key insights on your main leverage point for change, security, deployments, *and* reliability.

4. MEMORIES: WHAT DOES YOUR APP (AND SYSTEM) REMEMBER?

Credentials and other sensitive information — credit card information, private personally identiifable information (PII), customer data, sensitive IP intellectual property (and sometimes literal IP addresses) — are often stored in app or instance memory. How well is this being handled and secured? Ask yourself:

- 1. When are references cleaned out, access controlled, garbage collected, or restarted?
- 2. What controls inform ation from being dumped from memory or improperly accessed?

This is a more subtle yet dangerous point precisely because of the more tenuous state of logging or easily accessible forensics for data and operations in memory. Attackers that gain access to the memory of applications and systems can also gain visibility into an arbitrary volume and range of data that can be hard to pinpoint. Limiting or managing disclosures for this upper bound of information could get ugly. Help nip it in the bud by making sure sensitive data is encrypted wherever possible; decryption is handled precisely with layered defenses and strongly defended keys, and access controls and forensic logs are well-instrumented on sensitive systems.

5. STORMY WEATHER: ARE YOUR CLOUD HATCHES BATTENED DOWN?

Everything's going to "the cloud." Great. But have you heard that quip saying the cloud is just a name for someone else's computer? There's truth to that. It's basically a leased or rented stack that (hopefully) has been equipped with more lfexible scaling tools than the one had originally. What does that mean for companies? Many teams and organizations gain an illusory ease in spinning up and scaling compute power. But do they understand what they're spinning up, how they're constructed, and where they are vulnerable?

There are some key questions to consider and answer as you secure your cloud stack (and orgs):

- 1. Who or what gets to deploy stuff code, builds, changes, or new instances into your cloud network?
- 2. Have the application-to-application access patterns (risks) been vetted?
- 3. Have instances been secured and hardened? (e.g., unnecessary services shut down, programs stripped off, network rules vetted, logging tuned up, default creds changed, access systems integrated, etc.)
- 4. Are all administrators of the systems truly administrators?

The evolution of DevSecOps lets engineers stretch their wings to expand into new competency areas across all three pillars: development, security, and operations. Developers build out full-stack capability by constructing applications from start to ifnish and understanding the full lifecycle; every operations or system administrator must gain programming proifciency with at least one language. And any of those who neglect security will often learn the hard way how to master it.

Conclusion: What Does This All Mean?

The connecting theme is *trust*, but not blind nor even zero trust — instead, earned trust. Defense-in-depth is a team sport and a full-stack discipline, all the way from hardware to humans. Take all of that into account when setting your org's priorities. For example, ask:

- How do you know to trust where your toolchain is secure?
- How do you know to trust what has been hardened against a vulnerability?
- How do you know to trust who is making changes and commits to your systems?

Asking good questions can be as important —or more — as coming up with the answers. It gives the opposing party the room to develop their own pathways and muscle memory to a solution, and it can open up new lines of inquiry that previously had been hidebound in its own assumptions. Asking good questions allows room for new solutions to evolve that beneift — and even improve — the original solutions.



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on the boards of the Bay Area CSO Council and other non-proift organizations.

Software Supply Chain Security Checklist



5 Keys to Keeping Software Secure From Creation to Delivery

By Justin Albano, Software Engineer at IBM

Software security is a critical part of any product, but it can be a second-class consideration for many projects when time and budget pressures are applied. It is not enough to deliver working software; our deliveries must also be trustworthy and secured against known vulnerabilities. For many applications, the security of thousands or even millions of Personal Information (PI) records — and even entire company networks — rests upon the security of our applications.

Since the stakes are so high, we must perform our due diligence when securing our products against vulnerabilities and earn the trust of our customers and users.

In general, vulnerabilities can come from our application code and dependencies (the *software supply chain*). We must be deliberate about the dependencies we introduce into our product and ensure they do not comprom ise our application.

5-Step Checklist for Securing Your Software Supply Chain

The checklist below details ifve simple but essential steps that we can take to ensure that our software supply chain is secure and that we are delivering the most trustworthy software possible to our customers and users.

1. BE PROACTIVE

As professionals, we are responsible for securing our products. When we release a product, we put our names and seals of approval on the product. We are fallible, but when we release our product to customers with vulnerabilities and are not diligent in ifxing them, that relfects poorly upon our company and us.

Even when vulnerabilities come from the dependencies we include in our product, it is still our responsibility to patch our application and remove the vulnerabilities. We have decided to use those dependencies, and we must, therefore, assume the responsibility of adequately vetting and upgrading those dependencies, especially when known vulnerabilities arise. Ultimately, if our product compromises a user's or customer's security, the fault rests with us, and we must do everything within our purview to protect our users and customers.

□ 2. KNOW EVERY DEPENDENCY

Any code we include in our application — even transitive dependencies pulled in by our dependencies — can comprom ise our application. Therefore, it is our responsibility to enumerate our application's dependencies. This enumeration is sometimes called a *Software Bill of Materials* (BOM) and is analogous to a BOM in more traditional sectors, such as manufacturing.

We can ifnd a list of all dependencies (including transitive dependencies) in our application using the command-line interface for our package manager. For example:

- Maven mvn dependency: tree
- Gradle gradle q dependenci es
- NPM-npmlist --all

We must keep our BOM up to date and in sync with the dependencies included in our product. One of the simplest ways to ensure this consistency is to generate our BOM as a step in our automated build pipeline. Each time we build our application, our build system produces a new BOM. As we add, change, or remove dependencies, the BOM generated for each build will be updated accordingly.

3. TRACK THE LATEST VULNERABILITIES

Once we know what our product depends on, we must track the security state of those dependencies. Keeping up to date with security bulletins and the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) system can be daunting, but there are resources we can use to help us.

The following are some of the most common databases that contain up-to-date lists of existing software vulnerabilities:

- GitHub Advisory Database
- US National Vulnerabilities Database
- MITRE CVE Database

4. AUTOMATE THE PROCESS

Even for the most trivial project, keeping tabs on our dependencies and cross-referencing them with security bulletins can be overwhelming. We should automate these security steps as much as possible, and our build pipeline should run them each time we build our product. Whenever possible, we should also leverage the tools already available to us.

For example, if we host our application on GitHub, we can use Dependabot, and if we host our application on GitLab, we can use dependency scanning.

5. AUDIT DEPENDENCIES

Every dependency in our product brings with it a set of vulnerabilities. Even the most ubiquitous dependencies, like log4j, can be compromised (see Log4Shell). Therefore, we should always have a minimalist approach to our dependencies. If a dependency is unused, we should remove it immediately, and if the security risk posed by a dependency outweighs its reward, we must ifnd an alternative. Finding unused dependencies and generating warnings for such dependencies can often be performed automatically (e.g., mvn dependency: anal yze for Maven) and should be added as a step in our build pipelines.

Conclusion

We are responsible for the security of the products we deliver, even when vulnerabilities come from dependencies in our supply chain. Our customers' and users' trust in our products rests upon our diligence in ifnding and patching the vulnerabilities within our code and supply chain. Maintaining a professional mindset, understanding our exposure, tracking the latest vulnerabilities, automating our processes, and auditing our products go a long way in ensuring that our products meet the highest security standards and protect the data and systems of our users.



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playing or watching hockey, drawing, or reading.

Improve Microservices Security by Applying Zero-Trust Principles



By Apostolos Giannakidis, Principal Product Security Engineer at Microsoft

According to a 2020 Gartner report, it is estimated that by 2023, 75 percent of cybersecurity incidents will result from inadequate management of identities and excessive privileges. To a large extent, this is attributable to the increased number of identities used by modern cloud infrastructures. Applications run as microservices in fully virtualized environments that consist of dynamically orchestrated clusters of multiple containers in the cloud.

The security requirements in such environments are significantly different compared to monolithic applications running on premises. First, the concept of the perimeter does not exist in the cloud. Second, organizations are now handling thousands of dynamically created workloads and identities. Applying traditional IAM tools to manage the dynamic nature of these identities is not adequate. Using static, long-lived, and often excessive access permissions enables attackers to perform lateral movement.

To address these issues, a security model is needed that better satisifes today's application security and identity requirements. Zero-trust security is a proactive security model that uses continuous veriifcation and adaptive security controls to protect endpoints and access to applications as well as the data that lfowsbetween them. Zero trust replaces the outdated assumption that everything running inside an organization's network can be implicitly trusted. This security model has proven to minimize the attack surface, offer threat protection against internal and external attackers, reduce the lateral movement of attackers, increase operational efficiency, and help support continuous compliance with regulations such as PCI-DSS and the White House's 2021Cybersecurity Executive Order.

Since its inception, zero trust has evolved and expanded, touching almost every corner of the enterprise. This article will provide an overview of how the zero-trust principles can be applied in a microservices environment and what security controls should be implemented on the back end.

Zero-Trust Principles

Zero trust is primarily based on the concepts of "never trust, always verify" and "assume everything is hostile by default." It is driven by three core principles: assume breach, verify explicitly, and the principle of least privilege.

ASSUME BREACH

Always assume that cyber attacks will happen, the security controls have been compromised, and the network has been inifitrated. This requires using redundant and layered security controls, constant monitoring, and collection of telemetry to detect anomalies and respond in real time.

VERIFY EXPLICITLY

No network trafifc, component, action, or user is inherently trusted within a zero-trust security model, regardless of location, source, or identity. Trust only to the extent that you verify the identity, authenticity, permissions, data classification, etc.

PRINCIPLE OF LEAST PRIVILEGE

Always grant the least number of privileges. Only give access for the time that it is needed and remove access when it is not needed anymore. Least privilege access is essential to reduce the attack surface, limit the "blast radius," and minimize an attacker's opportunity to move laterally within an environment in case of compromise.

Zero-Trust Security in a Microservices Environment

When a microservice is compromised, it may maliciously inlfuence other services. By applying the principles of zero trust to a microservices environment, the trust between services, components, and networks is eliminated or minimized.

IDENTITY AND ACCESS MANAGEMENT

Identity and access management is the backbone of zero trust, which requires strong authentication and authorization of enduser identities, services, functions, workloads, and devices. To enable authentication and authorization, we must ifrst ensure that each workload is automatically assigned a cryptographically secure identity that is validated on every request. Importantly, ensure that there is an automated mechanism to reliably distribute, revoke in case of compromise, and frequently rotate the services' certificates and secrets. Use a cloud-neutral identity for workloads, such as SPIFFE for authentication and OPA for uniifed authorization across the stack.

SECURE SERVICE-TO-SERVICE COMMUNICATIONS

In zero trust, it is fundamental to treat the network as adversarial. Thus, all communication between services, APIs, and storage layers must be encrypted. The standard way of protecting data in transit is to use HTTPS and strict m TLS everywhere. Similarly, a strong authentication mechanism should be enforced across all microservices. It must be understood that not every service that can be authenticated should be authorized. Authorization must be done based on the authentication context and on access control policies, and it should be performed at the edge of each microservice — not at the network edge.

To achieve this, use a service mesh, like Istio or Linkerd, for:

- Automatic certiifcate management
- Trafifc interception
- Secure service-to-service communication without application code changes
- Micro-segmentation (via authorization policies)

This reduces the blast radius of an attack and prevents attackers from pivoting from one compromised service into other parts of the infrastructure. In a container orchestration environment, such as Kubernetes, deifne network policies for egress and ingress isolation at a granular level. Enforce zero trust for all trafifc (east-west and north-south) by specifying network policies and service-to-service level RBAC policies that limit access per cluster and per source, following the need-to-know principle.

SECURE ACCESS TO RESOURCES

External entities must not access the microservices environment directly. Instead, use an API gateway as a single entry point to the microservices deployment. To pass the user context or the identity of the caller, implement a pattern, such as the phantom token pattern (*API Security in Action*, part 11.6.1) or the passport pattern. Validate the external access token and user context at the edge and generate a new short-lived token that represents the external entity identity and is cryptographically signed by the trusted issuer and propagated to back-end microservices. Ensure that the new token's scope of access is as limited as the scope of the identity of the external entity.

Most importantly, assume that access tokens can be stolen and create access tokens with a short lifespan on a resource-byresource basis. Use a service mesh to verify the validity of the access tokens at the microservice edge. In all cases, access to resources should be granted using ifne-grained role-based access controls with the least privileges.




Figure 1: Data in-transit, data at-rest, and data in-use encryption

DATA SECURITY

It is essential to ensure that all data is classified according to their secrecy and conifdentiality. Create a data registry to know which microservice handles what data. Then, implement multiple layers of data encryption, depending on the data classification. Do not trust only the encryption of external components (including databases and messaging systems like Kafka). Use application-level encryption (ALE) to transfer personally identiifable information (PII) and highly conifdential data between microservices. To mitigate the risk of unauthorized data modiifcation, perform data integrity checksums throughout the data lifecycle.

INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY

Adopting an immutable infrastructure has become standard. Use Infrastructure as Code to provision components upfront and never change them after deployment. Do not trust the storage mediums (persistent or temporary) and do not store any sensitive data or secrets in an unencrypted form. All secrets, certificates, and API keys should be securely stored in accesscontrolled centralized key vaults.

Zero trust always assumes that the network is comprom ised. To contain a possible comprom ise and prevent lateral spreading through the rest of the network, implement network micro-segmentation, create software-deifned perimeters in each segment, and place microservices in each segment according to their functionality, business domain, and data classification. Communication between segments should be well-deifned and controlled through API gateways. Consider adopting a cell-based architecture for inter-segment communication.

CONTAINER AND CLUSTER SECURITY

Zero trust requires the explicit verification of container im ages, containers, and cluster nodes. Thus, use container im ages that are signed only from trusted issuers and registries. Allow im ages to be used only if they are scanned in the DevSecOps pipeline and have no vulnerabilities. To reduce the risk of privilege escalation, run the Docker daem on and all containers without root privileges. One standard way is to run Docker in rootless mode. Logically isolate high-risk applications and workloads in the sam e cluster for the least number of privileges.

RUNTIME SECURITY

Consider running security-sensitive microservices on conifdential virtual machines in hardware-based trusted execution environments with encrypted memory. To reduce the risk of rogue or compromised nodes in the cluster, verify the integrity of nodes, VMs, and containers by running them on instances enabled with Secure Boot and Virtual Trusted Platform Module.

Also, by running containers in read-only mode, iflesystem integrity is achieved and attackers are prevented from making modifications. Finally, we can reduce our trust for the runtime by adopting a RASP solution that inspects all code executed by the runtime and dynamically stops the execution of malicious code.




Figure 2: Zero-trust runtime via conifdential computing and RASP

Image adapted from "Application enclave support with Intel SGX based conifdential computing nodes on AKS," Microsoft Azure Documentation

Conclusion

Implementing a zero-trust architecture is a critical defense-in-depth strategy and has become a mandatory security model in modern IT infrastructures. It is important to understand that implementing a zero-trust architecture does not mean zero security incidents. The goal is to continually layer security controls to increase the cost of attacks. As we introduce more friction into the cyber-attack kill chain, the attacker's value proposition will be reduced, and potential attacks will be disrupted.

The key to a successful implementation of a zero-trust architecture is to follow the guidance of whitepapers such as NIST's "Planning for a Zero Trust Architecture" and the U.S. Office of Management and Budget's "Moving the U.S. Government Towards Zero Trust Cybersecurity Principles."

In this article, we provided an overview of how to apply the core principles of the zero-trust model in a microservices environment, and we examined the critical areas and the zero-trust security goals of microservices that need to be achieved. The highly distributed and heterogeneous nature of a microservice deployment and its complex communication patterns has increased the number of different components and the volume of data that is exposed on the network. This provides a broader attack surface compared to a traditional deployment of a monolithic application.

Because the security of a system is as good as its weakest link, applying the zero-trust core principles to proactively secure all layers and components of a microservices deployment is fundamental for a modern, reliable, and mature cybersecurity strategy. With a proper zero-trust strategy for microservices, the risk of compromised clusters, lateral movement, and data breaches in most cases can be eliminated.

Zero trust is a necessary evolution to security; how ever, its im plem entation should not be a destination. It is a continuous journey and an organization-wide commitment. Since its inception, zero trust has become a widely deployed security model and a business-critical cybersecurity priority. Microsoft's 2021Zero Trust Adoption Report conifrms that point on page 11, indicating that 76 percent of organizations have started adopting a zero-trust strategy. The industry is rapidly adopting zero trust across the whole infrastructure and not just on end-user access.



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acknowledged by Oracle and is featured on Google's Vulnerability Hall of Fame. He enjoys going to concerts, and his vinyl collection no longer ifts in his room.

Building a Secure Mobile App in the Cloud



A Complete Guide for iOS and Android

By Boris Zaikin, Software & Cloud Architect at Nordcloud GmbH

Building secure mobile applications is a difficult process, especially in the cloud. We must consider that mobile platforms, like iOS and Android, have completely different architectures and quality guidelines. Also, we need to take care of our cloud architecture on the back end. In this article, we will have a look at the top six security vulnerabilities, OWASP's best practices for building/testing iOS and Android applications, and guidelines for iOS and Android. Last but not least, we will explore an example of DevSecOps for mobile applications.

Top Three Attack Examples

To understand the importance of security for mobile apps, let's ifrst look at three of the most prominent hacks of mobile apps that led to huge ifnancial and marketing issues for the affected companies.

PARKMOBILE BREACH

In the cyber attack on the ParkMobile app in 2021, hackers managed to steal 21m illion user accounts. According to Security7, hackers managed to steal telephone numbers, license plate numbers, and email addresses. It seems like all the unencrypted data were stolen passwords. However, credit cards were encrypted, so hackers didn't manage to encrypt data as the keys weren't stolen.

JUSPAY DATA LEAK

Juspay, a payment operator that provides services for Uber, Am azon, Swiggy, and Flipkart, was hacked through their mobile app in August 2020. The hacker stole 35 million records, including credit card data, ifngerprints, and masked card data.

WALGREENS MOBILE APP LEAK

In 2020, Walgreens' mobile app had integrated malware that watched personal messages and info. It resulted in a lot of user data being compromised, including names, prescription numbers, and addresses.

Top Six OWASP Security Vulnerability Types in iOS and Android

Before we jump into iOS and Android guidelines and OWASP Testing Guides, let's look at the top six OWASP vulnerability types:

Table	1
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Vulnerability Type	Description
Authentication issues, insecure communication	A mobile application has unencrypted UI forms, algorithms, and protocols to authenticate. An attacker uses the fake app/malware to scan and observe the application transport layer. Also, weak passwords, using geolocation to authenticate users, or using persistent authentication may lead to sensitive data leaks.
Reverse engineering	This vulnerability allows an attacker to analyze and obfuscate the targeted application. This may lead to sensitive data leakage that is hard coded in application conifguration variables or constants. In addition, attackers may ifnd URLs and conifgs to the back-end servers.
Data storage security vulnerability	This vulnerability allows attackers to steal data from data storage. We partially link it with "improper platform usage." To prevent data leakage, we should use only encrypted data storage, avoid storing sensitive data (passwords, card numbers) in the device, encrypt data transfer, and use only encrypted storage OS features (e.g., iOS Keychain). We can reference CW E-922 of the mobile vulnerability registry.

TABLE 1 CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE

Table 1(continued)


Vulnerability Type	Description
lm proper platform usage	This type of attack relies on the issue of developers not using (or improperly using) security features that are included in the operation system. Security features include Face ID, iOS Keychain, and Touch ID. For example, developers may use insecure local storage instead of iOS Keychain to store sensitive data.
Code tam pering	Code tampering is when an attacker downloads an app and makes code changes. For example, they create fake registrations or payment forms and then upload apps back to the market or create cloned ones. It can also be a fake app (such as free mobile cleaning tools or free games in app stores) that can modify the code of another app. Usually, banking apps are one of the scenarios to target, and Mobile ZeuS or Trojan-Spy can be used to steal mobile TAN code.

In my opinion, this is a list of the most important vulnerability types. However, OWASP provides a list of 10, and it also provides standards and testing guides. We will cover these in the next section.

OWASP Mobile Application Security Fundamentals

OWASP mobile application security fundamentals consist of several sources and contain OWASP Mobile AppSecurity Veriifcation Standard (MASVS), OWASP Mobile Application Security Testing Guide (MASTG), and the Mobile Security Checklist. Below in Figure 1, you will see the fundamentals of mobile application security in detail:





Let's have a more detailed look at the mobile app checklist.

MOBILE APPLICATION SECURITY CHECKLIST

The Mobile Application Security Checklist is a part of the MASTG. It is a set of rules/checks that a dev team should include when securing a mobile app. It contains more than 100 rows and is organized by the following categories:

- Architecture, Design, and Threat Modeling Requirements
- Data Storage and Privacy Requirements
- Cryptography Requirements
- Authentication and Session Management Requirements
- Network Communication Requirements
- · Platform Interaction Requirements
- · Code Quality and Build Setting Requirements
- Resilience Requirements

Each rule (or check) has an identification code and description. All rules have priority marks. "L1" or "L2" means that the application should have the rule/check implemented. "R" means that it is required, so the team must implement everything marked "R." Download the full example on OWASP's website.

Next, let's focus on guidelines for speciifc platforms, with attention to the most popular ones: iOS and Android.

Secure Mobile Apps in iOS and Android: Guidelines

As we have already partially touched some iOS security APIs, we will continue discussing it with the addition of Android. In the ifrst section below, I've gathered guidelines and best practices about iOS API security features.

APPLE APP SANDBOX, DATA PROTECTION API, AND KEYCHAIN

The Apple App Sandbox provides an API to isolate an app and prevent access to the main system or other apps. It's based on UNIX's user permission and ensures that apps get executed with a less privileged "mobile" user. Also, it includes address space layout random ization (ASLR) and ARMs Never eXecute, which prevent memory-related security bugs and stops malicious code from being executed.

The Data Protection API allows an app to encrypt and decrypt its ifles, and it may solve several security issues like authentication and reverse engineering. Each ifle has four available protection levels, and by default, it's encrypted with the ifrst user authentication. However, we should increase the level to provide the highest protection.

Last but not least, the keychain. It provides secured hardware-accelerated data storage. iOS provides this API to store certificates and passwords with the highest level of security. For each item in the keychain, we can deifne specific access policies. Especially when the user needs to request Face ID or Touch ID, the biometric enrollments won't change since the item was added to the keychain.




Figure 2: Keychain API

ANDROID-ENCRYPTED KEY-VALUE STORAGE, FILE ENCRYPTION, AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC APIS

Same as iOS, Android also has many similar features to store data securely. The ifrst one is key-value storage. It allows storing data using Shar edPr ef er ences to set a scope of visibility for items in the storage. We need to keep in mind that stored values are not encrypted by default. Therefore, malware may have access to the data.

If we need to encrypt data manually, we beneift from using Cryptographic API. We can generate a secure key with KeyGenerator, then save and extract the encrypted value to Android Keystore. To work securely with ifles and external storage, Android has the Cryptography Support Library. It supports a lot of cryptography algorithms to encrypt/decrypt ifles.

HTTPS, SSL PINNING, AND PUSH NOTIFICATIONS

A secured communication layer is the next big milestone to a secured app. First, we need to ensure that we are using HTTPS. iOS has a feature called App Transport Security (ATS) that blocks insecure connections by default, so all connections must use HTTPS/TLS. In addition, the SSL pinning feature helps to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. It will validate the system certificate if it were signed by a root certificate authority.

To use this feature, the app should run additional trust validation of server certiifcates. Push notiifcations are another part that should be secured. We should use Apple's Push Notiifcation service (APNs) and the UNNot if i cat i onService extension extension. This will allow us to use placeholders for sensitive mobile app data and send encrypted messages.

Also, consider using Apple's CryptoKit. It is a new API introduced in iOS 13 that provides the following features:

- Hashing data
- Authenticating data using message authentication codes
- Perform ing key agreement
- Creating and verifying signatures

Android has similar options. It allows only HTTPS to transport encrypted data with TLS. And it is the same story for SSL pinning. To prevent man-in-the-middle attacks, we can perform additional trust validations of the server certificates.

Secure Mobile Apps in Azure and AWS

To build secure applications, Azure has services such as the Azure App Center. It allows for the building and distribution of mobile apps and provides a lot of security options:

- Data transit encryption support HTTPS using TLS 1.2 by default; also encrypted at rest
- · Code security provides multiple tools to analyze code dependency to detect security vulnerabilities
- Authentication contains features like Microsoft Authentication Library (MSAL), which supports multiple authorization grants and associated token lfows

Alongside Azure, AWS has some powerful services to consider when building a secure mobile app. Take AWS Cognito as an example. It is a user-state service with options to develop unique identities for users. It supports:

- Secure app authentication
- Enabling developers to include user sign-up
- · Easy sign-in and access control focused on web and mobile apps


AWS has one unique service with the name AWS Device Farm. It provides not only automated testing and simulation environments, but also contains features to validate app dependencies and run security checks. Now let's move on to an example of building a DevOps process with security features.

An Example of DevSecOps for Mobile Applications

In this section, I've created an example of a DevSecOps scenario to deliver secure mobile applications (see Figure 3). This process can be reused within the most popular CI/CD platforms and cloud providers:

- 1. Git operation steps Contains standard commit/push operations when the source control triggers a build.
- 2. Run static analyses and code linting steps Validates the code styles, usability, data lfow issues, and security issues (e.g., Xcode Static Analyzer).
- 3. **Dependency validation step** Provides excessive validation checks through the library tree used in the app. This validation step may reveal a fake, malicious library that can manipulate code or even steal personal user data.
- 4. **Application log validation step** Checks if logs contain sensitive data like environment passwords, test tokens, or authorization data. After the dev/test process, the application package may contain some sensitive data as developers may not notice it after debugging the app. (This step can be run after deployment to the dev/test environment as well).
- 5. QA steps:
 - Deploy the app to the dev/test environment for the QA team to test.
 - Promote and deploy the app to the marketplace validation.

Figure 3: Common DevSecOps process of a secure mobile app



Conclusion

In this article, I've provided a short guide on secure mobile applications. We discovered that the OWASP community has major security fundamentals, and OWASP can be used as a strong base for building a new app or refactoring an existing one. Knowing cloud services and examples of DevSecOps allows us to start building secure mobile apps with minimum effort and makes it harder for an attacker to compromise our app. Also, we went through iOS and Android security features, security APIs, and discovered how to use them properly.



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I'm a certiifed senior software and cloud architect who has solid experience designing and developing complex solutions based on the Azure, Google, and AWS clouds. I have expertise in building distributed systems and fram eworks based on Kubernetes and Azure Service Fabric. My areas of interest include

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Sur vi vi ng the Incident

Building a Tailored Guide for Handling Security Incidents



By Roderick Chambers, Senior Information Security Specialist at Recorded Future

A wave of cyber incidents in recent years, such as the SolarWinds supply chain attack, Accellion data breach, Exchange Server, and Log4j vulnerabilities, have exposed the "fragility" of modern businesses and the challenges in information security. The outcome of a cyber event can range from a minor business operations disruption to "crippling ifnancial and legal costs" (Alan P., GCST). Despite how increasingly sophisticated threat actors have become, the typical attack scenarios remain the same, and thus analysts and responders can adequately address these events using previous tactics.

Effective incident response (IR) playbooks are the best antidote to unpredictable attacks. A practical IR playbook is key to stay organized and lead to minimal risk. According to Jyotsana Gupta, an "incident response is a process that allows you to respond quickly and effectively to a cybersecurity breach" (Wire 19). IR playbooks enable analysts to respond to an incident consistently, ensure correct procedures are followed, and provide organizations with a roadmap to determine where processes can be autom ated and enhanced to improve critical response time.

What goes into creating an IR playbook? We will discuss how to design an IR playbook for an organization, covering topics such as assembling your IR team, identifying critical systems, creating notiifcation procedures, and conducting post-incident review. For those eager to design a large-scale IR playbook, NIST and SANS are the two most popular incident response fram eworks for granular IR planning approaches. While they differ in categorizing the incident response phases, both follow the sam e basic process.

How to Build an Incident Response Playbook

What's your plan? While Indiana Jones might say, "I don't know, I'm making this up as I go," good luck trying that line on customers and regulators. To begin drafting the IR playbook, some companies require engagement from critical business units to form an incident response (IR) team, while other large organizations may already have an established, dedicated computer security incident response team (CSIRT). The core of the IR or CSIRT team will usually be IT or cybersecurity staff, and the ideal sponsor is from the C-Suite, such as the CISO, who will help empower the team with resources to act swiftly and drive accountability across the organization. Other members may be drawn from the IT operations staff, the vulnerability and risk management team, security engineers and architects, and intelligence analysts. Extended partners may include other capabilities, such as PR, HR, and legal.




Figure 1: Hierarchy of an CSIRT/IR team

IDENTIFY THE CROWN JEW ELS

The next step to the IR playbook is to identify the "crown jewels" of the organization — the critical systems, services, and operations that, if impacted by a cyber event, would disrupt business operations and cause a loss of revenue. Similarly, understanding the collected data type, how it is transmitted and stored, and who should access it must be mapped to ensure data security.

Identifying and mapping critical systems can be accomplished through penetration tests, risk assessments, and threat modeling. A risk assessment is often the ifrst tool to identify potential attack vectors and prioritize security events. However, to achieve a proactive stance, organizations are increasingly leveraging threat intelligence and modeling to identify and address vulnerabilities and security gaps early on before a known attack occurs. The primary goal is to identify weaknesses or vulnerabilities with assets to reduce the attack surface and close all the security gaps.

This guide will focus on web application security as our attack scenario. Why web application security? Applications have become the backbone of most organizations, making web applications, websites, and web-based services a prime target for malicious threat actors attempting to exploit vulnerable application code. As is stated by Gupta:

Web applications are attractive targets for the following reasons:

- **Complexity** web applications have inherent complex source code, making it likely that an app contains unpatched vulnerabilities or is open to code manipulation.
- *High-value rewards*—attackers can manipulate source code to access valuable data, including personal and sensitive business information.
- **Easy execution**—attacking web applications is usually straightforward with automation and large-scale attacks targeting multiple sites simultaneously (Wire19).


Understand the Threats

The next step is creating notification procedures led by the IR or CSIRT team. In the attack scenario (Figure 2), the IR team or CSIRT will often begin with basic security procedures of securing web applications, such as deploying and conifguring a web application ifrewall (WAF) or conifguring access control policies. The security team might block cyber attacks using WAF rules to block active exploits and prevent further damage.

Figure 2: Sample attack scenario response worklfow

CSIRT/IR Workflow

- User opens an attachment on an email Connection to a C2 Server is established
- User reports the event to the SOC Detect
- SOC Identifies a communication from the users PC to an IP address Respond
- IP address is known malicious
- IP Address is Blocked Protect
- Users Asset is cleaned
- Additional Assets are identified...



Web application conifgurations allow and deny access by creating policy rules in the web access layer. A baseline example is focusing on URL category ifltering by creating policies:

- Allow users to access all organizations' approved social networking sites such as LinkedIn and block other sites such as TikTok.
- Allow users to access personal em ail accounts but prevent sending em ail attachments.

When WAFs and conifgurations are in place, the web application is monitored for suspicious activity. The communication aspect of the IR playbook comes into play when careful logging and monitoring at the application level detect suspicious activity, such as repeated access attempts or unexpected user accounts being created. Suspicious activity is often detected using a security information and event management (SIEM) solution or through regular security testing using a web vulnerability scanner (Alan P., GCST).

After detecting a security incident, the IR team should "triage it," meaning they should determine the appropriate action to limit short-term consequences and stop minor incidents from growing into large-scale attacks (Alan P., GCST). But what happens when the cyber event cannot be contained, and the evidence of a data breach is quickly mounting?

According to Alan P., "global cyberattacks have served as a reminder that plugging security holes is often the easiest part." Threat actors such as advanced persistent threats (APT) don't conduct hit-and-run attacks. These attacks "inifltrate target systems to maintain a stealthy and persistent presence. Eliminating the entry point is the start of a long and arduous process" with the IR or CSIRT team (Alan P., GCST).

DETERMINE COMMUNICATION CHANNELS

When outages in programs or degradation of system performance occur, communication must be clear and effective. Communication will directly impact your team's responsiveness to threats. While the CSIRT team is focused on analysis, containment, and remediation, proper incident response communications to leadership and read-in members are critical to success.

Managers should be informed of the situation and understand the implications to give their team the next steps to respond to an incident. Many users have questions such as whether the users should keep working or turn off their machines. What is worse are users unplugging machines with the belief it will stop the issue from spreading (David Landsberger, Com pTIA).

The next phase is to manage staff and customers. Gupta notes:

After a data breach, there might be a legal obligation to notify data owners (i.e., per the GDPR). The jurisdiction and data class will determ ine whether you must report the incident to the relevant authorities and provide updates when new information is available (Wire19).

A few examples of how to communicate an incident to staff and customers include:


- An email for internal incident response
- A status page
- A message via chat channels within your team (e.g., Slack)
- Outward-facing communication with clients and customers through public relations teams

ENABLE POSTMORTEMS

Molly Star (Lightstep Blog) states: "Incident response management doesn't end when the incident is resolved. Your playbook should detail your postmortem process, from documentation and discussion to action items." Postmortem follow-up is essential because the organization needs to review how they can improve the security of their systems and, in other words, "harden" their perimeter.

The ifrst step is to identify the root cause of the cyber event via the logs on your ifrewall/WAFs or through the SIEM. By identifying the root cause, remediation can begin to prevent the same or similar cyber events. No solution is perfect, and even if an organization is doing everything right, it is best to adopt an assume-breach mentality.

Figure 3: Summary of incident response process



Conclusion

Data breaches are inarguable and demonstrate a failure to secure systems, and it's on the organization to respond quickly and effectively. Having a tested IR playbook in hand, continually practiced through tabletop exercises, can help your team cross the ifnish line while minimizing material impact to the company. Incidents can have a lasting impact, even if adequately handled. A developer-driven, security-ifrst mindset is worth considering. It has a positive ripple effect on the business if developers and security teams can work together and learn lessons from previous incidents.

This guide is a wake-up call to implement holistic inform ation security practices that have both developers and security teams moving toward the same goal as a collective. Dedicating time to threat model with developers to build secure code upfront is a small resource investment that has the potential to yield significant gains for the business in the long term. After all, it can shrink the attack surface, reducing impact should an incident occur.

References:

- "An Incident Response Plan for Your Website" by Jyotsana Gupta (Wire19)
- "What Is an Incident Response Plan and How to Create One" by David Landsberger (Com pTIA)
- "Incident Response Steps in Web Application Security" by Alan P. (GCST)
- "Building an Incident Response Playbook" by Molly Star (Lightstep Blog)



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Cham bers serves as public and private sector entities' information security and intelligence advisor. He began his career in the US federal government, specifcally in the intelligence community, where he served as intelligence operations professional and technical collections lead. Cham bers served as the

form er deputy superintendent and director of the cyber intelligence unit for the US State of New York State Department of Financial Services.

Diving Deeper Into Application Security

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MULTIMEDIA



Cloud Security Podcast

This vendor-neutral and easily accessible weekly podcast is hosted by Ashish Rajan and Shilpi Bhattacharjee. You can catch them discussing all aspects of cloud security on your favorite

podcast platform, but be sure to catch their podcasts live streaming on YouTube and Twitter every weekend.



Application Security Weekly

Hosts Mike Shema, John Kinsella, and Akira Brand interview industry professionals from the AppSec, DevOps, DevSecOps, and other related ifelds to give you all the news and

information you need to know in these realms. Their podcast will help you make sure your modern security practices are strong enough to ifght off any attack.



Open Source Security Podcast

This security podcast is like no other: It talks about open source in every episode. Join hosts Kurt Seifried and Josh Bressers to learn more about popular security topics that span

application security, loT, cloud, DevOps, and more. With more than 300 episodes, you're bound to ifndthe information you want and the information you didn't know you needed.



Security Now

Steve Gibson and Leo Laporte will keep you abreast on all the news and hot topics you need to know in order to stay up to date in the security realm. You can catch them streaming

live every Tuesday or browse their well-stocked library of podcasts. And a little fun fact for you: Gibson coined the term "spyware" and created the ifrst anti-spyware program!

@TCMSecurityAcademy

From easy-to-digest 10-minute videos to two-hour courses, The Cyber Mentor YouTube Channel covers topics such as web application penetration testing, Linux, bug hunting reviews, tools, and more. TCM tackles everything practically but with a bit of fun, keeping you constantly entertained.

REFCARDS

Cloud-Native Application Security: Patterns and Anti-Patterns

Cloud-native applications leverage modern practices like microservices architectures, containerization, DevOps, IaC, and automated CI/CD processes. This Refcard will walk through the critical challenges of cloud-native security, show how to build security into the CI/CD pipeline, and introduce the core patterns and anti-patterns of cloud-native application security.

IaC Security

The responsibility and accountability for security is rapidly shifting toward DevOps engineers, as they have greater visibility into the broader architecture of processes and systems used to deploy applications. Effective DevSecOps makes app deployments, operations, and service monitoring easier and more secure. In particular, DevOps engineers will be responsible for securing the Infrastructure as Code in which they build. In this Refcard, we explore IaC security, how it works, why it's important, and core practices for success.

Introduction to DevSecOps

With DevSecOps, you can reach higher security standards while following DevOps principles. This Refcard will show you how to get started with DevSecOps with key themes, crucial steps to begin your journey, and a guide to choosing security tools and technologies to build your DevSecOps pipeline.

TREND REPORTS

Application Security

In DZone's 2021 Application Security Trend Report, readers will discover how the shift in security focus across the SDLC is impacting development teams — from addressing the most common threat agents and attack vectors to exploring the best practices and tools being employed to develop secure applications.

DevSecOps

Security has long been an afterthought, but organizations have started incorporating security into their DevOps pipelines. With this in mind, we consulted industry experts and leaders about the state of DevSecOps adoption and implementation to help readers understand more effective ways to manage security throughout every step of the SDLC.

Solutions Directory



This directory contains authentication, vulnerability detection, application security testing, IAM, WAF, cloud security, DDoS protection, penetration testing tools, as well as many other tools to assist you with your application security. It provides pricing data and product category information gathered from vendor websites and project pages. Solutions are selected for inclusion based on several impartial criteria, including solution maturity, technical innovativeness, relevance, and data availability.

| | DZONE'S 2022 APPLICATION SECURITY SOLUTIONS DIRECTORY | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------|---|--------------------------------------|---|--------------|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| | Company | Product | Purpose | Availability | Website | | | | | | |
| | Azul | Azul Vulnerability
Detection | Agentless cloud solution
to identify and track Java
vulnerabilities | Free tier | azul.com/products/vulnerability-
detection | | | | | | |
| PARTNERS | Check Point Software
Technologies Ltd. | Cloud Guard CNAPP | Cloud native application protection | By request | checkpoint.com/cloudguard/cnapp | | | | | | |
| 2 PART | | zDefend | Runtime Application Self-
Protection (RASP) | | zim perium .com /zdefend | | | | | | |
| 2022 | Zimperium | zKeyBox | Cryptographic key protection | By request | zim perium .com /zkeybox | | | | | | |
| | | zScan | App security testing | | zim perium .com /zscan | | | | | | |
| | | zShield | App shielding/obfuscation | | zim perium .com /zshield | | | | | | |
| | Company | Product | Purpose | Availability | Website | | | | | | |
| | | Thunder CFW | Convergent ifrewall and DDoSprotection | | a10networks.com/products/thunder-cfw | | | | | | |
| | | Thunder SSLi | SSL visibility and decryption | By request | a10networks.com/products/thunder-ssli | | | | | | |
| | A10 Networks | Thunder TPS | DDoSdetection and mitigation | | a10networks.com/products/thunder-tps | | | | | | |
| | | Thunder ADC | Application delivery and load balancing | | a10 networks.com /products/thunder-adc | | | | | | |
| | | Thunder Harm ony
Controller | Service analytics and managem ent | | a10 networks.com /products/harm on y-
controller | | | | | | |
| | Acunetix by Invicti
Security | Acunetix | Web application security testing | By request | acunetix.com | | | | | | |
| | Airlock | Airlock | Secure access managem ent | By request | airlock.com/en | | | | | | |
| | | App & API Protector | Security for websites, apps,
and APIs | | akam ai.com /products/app-and-api-
protector | | | | | | |
| | Akam ai | Enterprise Application
Access | Zero-trust network access | Trial period | akam ai.com /products/enterprise-
application-access | | | | | | |
| | | Secure Internet Access
Enterprise | Secure web gateway | | akam ai.com /products/secure-internet-
access-enterprise | | | | | | |
| | | AWSWAF | Web application protection | | aws.am azon.com /w af | | | | | | |
| | | Amazon CloudFront | Low-latency content delivery network | | aws.amazon.com/cloudfront | | | | | | |
| | Am azon Web
Services | Amazon Cognito | Custom er identity and access m anagem ent | Free tier | aws.amazon.com/cognito | | | | | | |
| | | AWS Shield | Managed DDoS protection | | aws.am azon.com /shield | | | | | | |
| | | AWS Secrets Manager | Secrets lifecycle m an agem ent | | aws.amazon.com/secrets-manager | | | | | | |

| 0 | | APPLICATION SECURITY SO | | |
|--|---|---|---|--|
| Company | Product | Purpose | Availability | Website |
| Anchore | Anchore Enterprise | SBOM-powered, end-to-
end software supply chain
security | By request | anchore.com/platform |
| An om ali | Anom ali Platform | Extended detection and response | By request | anom ali.com /products |
| | Aqua Trivy | Vulnerability and misconifguration scanning | | aquasec.com/products/trivy |
| Aqua | Aqua kube-bench | Kubernetes deployment security | Open source | github.com/aquasecurity/kube-bench |
| Αγμα | Aqua Cloud Sploit | Cloud security posture management | | github.com/aquasecurity/cloudsploit |
| | Aqua Platform | Cloud-native security | By request | aquasec.com /aqua-cloud-native-
security-platform |
| Arm or | Armor | Cloud-native cybersecurity | By request | arm or.com |
| Arnica | Arnica | Software supply chain security autom ation | By request | arnica.io |
| | AT&T Secure Web
Gateway | Location, user, and device uniifed protection | | cybersecurity.att.com/products/secure-
web-gateway |
| | AT&T DDoS Defense | Cloud-based monitoring of volum etric DDoS attacks | | cybersecurity.att.com/products/reactive-
ddos-services |
| AT&T Cybersecurity | AT&T Token
Authentication Service | User authentication service | By request | cybersecurity.att.com/products/token-
authentication |
| | AT&T Managed
Endpoint Security with
SentinelOne | Endpoint protection,
detection, response, and
control | | cybersecurity.att.com/products/
sentinel-one |
| Barracuda | Cloud Application
Protection | Web application and API protection | Trial period | barracuda.com/products/application-
cloud-security |
| Dallacuua | CloudGen Firewall | Distributed network security and optimization | | barracuda.com /products/
cloudgenifrewall |
| BeyondTrust | Endpoint Privilege
Management | Least privilege enforcem ent | By request | beyondtrust.com /privilege-
m anagem ent |
| | Secure Remote Access | Remote access management | | beyondtrust.com/secure-remote-access |
| Ditdefeeder | GravityZone Business
Security Enterprise | Endpoint protection, detection, and response | Trial paried | bitdefender.com/business/products/
gravityzone-enterprise-security.html |
| Bitdefender | GravityZone Security for
Mobile Devices | Mobile device protection for organizations | Trial period | bitdefender.com/business/enterprise-
products/mobile-security.html |
| BlackBerry Cylance
Endpoint Security | Cylance Endpoint
Security | Al-driven endpoint security | By request | blackberry.com/us/en/products/cylance-
endpoint-security |
| BMC | BMC AMI Security | Autom atic m ainfram e threat detection and response | Trial period | bm c.com /it-solution s/bm c-am i-
m ainfram e-security.htm l |
| Broadcom | ACF2™ | Scalable m odern m ainfram e security | By request | broadcom .com /products/m ainfram e/
identity-access/acf2 |
| | Symantec Enterprise
Cloud | Data-centric hybrid security | - , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | broadcom.com/products/cybersecurity |
| Browser Exploitation
Fram ework Project | BeEf | Penetration testing | Open source | beefproject.com |
| Cavirin | Hybrid Cloud Security &
Compliance Platform | Real-tim e monitoring,
threat detection, and auto-
rem ediation | By request | cavirin.com/products.html |
| | | | | |

| DZONE'S 2022 APPLICATION SECURITY SOLUTIONS DIRECTORY | | | | |
|---|--|--|--------------|---|
| Company | Product | Purpose | Availability | Website |
| | Application Shield | Cloud-based web service protection | Tripl pariod | cdnetworks.com/cloud-security/
application-shield |
| CDNetworks | Flood Shield | Cloud-based DDoS
protection | Trial period | cdnetworks.com/cloud-security/lfood-
shield |
| Chainguard | Chainguard Enforce | Software supply chain risk
management | By request | chainguard.dev/chainguard-enforce |
| | Checkmarx One | Comprehensive application security | Trial period | checkmarx.com/product/application-
security-platform |
| | Checkmarx SAST | Static application security testing | By request | checkmarx.com/cxsast-source-code-
scanning |
| Checkmarx | KICS | Static code analysis of IaC | Open source | checkmarx.com/product/opensource/kics-
open-source-infrastructure-as-code-project |
| | Checkmarx SCS | Supply chain security | By request | checkmarx.com/cxscs-supply-chain-
security |
| | Checkmarx SCA | Open-source risk scanning | Dyrequest | checkmarx.com/cxsca-open-source-
scanning |
| CIRT.net | Nikto2 | Web server scanning and testing | Open source | cirt.net/Nikto2 |
| | Secure Endpoint | Endpoint protection across control points | Trial period | cisco.com/site/us/en/products/security/
endpoint-security/secure-endpoint/
index.html |
| Cisco | Umbrella | Cloud-delivered security | | umbrella.cisco.com |
| | Secure Cloud Analytics | Uniifed threat detection
for on-prem and cloud
environm ents | | cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/
stealthwatch-cloud/index.html |
| Citrix | App Delivery and
Security Service | Application performance and security | By request | citrix.com/products/citrix-app-delivery-
and-security |
| Cloudentity | Cloudentity | Authorization, API access, and data security | Free tier | cloudentity.com |
| CloudIfare | CloudIfare Application
Security Portfolio | Web application and API protection | Free tier | cloudIfare.com/application-security |
| Code42 | Incydr | Data leak and IP theft protection | By request | code42.com/incydr |
| Codenotary | Trustcenter | SBOM management | Trial period | codenotary.com/products/trustcenter |
| Cofense | Cofense Protect | Phishing attack detection | By request | cofense.com/product-services/cofense-
protect |
| Colense | Cofense Triage | Phishing em ail analysis,
identiifcation, and mitigation | ByTequest | cofense.com/product-services/cofense-
triage |
| Conviso | Conviso Platform | DevSecOps | By request | convisoappsec.com |
| Corelight | Investigator | Network detection and response | By request | corelight.com/products/investigator |
| CrowdStrike | Falcon Platform | Endpoint, cloud workload, identity, and data security | Trial period | crowdstrike.com/falcon-platform |
| Cybeats | SBOM Studio | SBOM lifecycle management with cybersecurity insights | By request | cybeats.com/sbom-studio |
| Cybeats | RDSP IoT Security | loT and connected device security | byrequest | cybeats.com/rdsp-iot-security |
| CyberArk | Conjur | Secrets m an agem ent | Open source | conjur.org |
| | | | | |

| DZONE'S 2022 APPLICATION | SECURITY SOLUTIONS DIRECTORY |
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| Company | Product | Purpose | Availability | Website |
|-----------------------|--|---|--------------|---|
| Cybereason | Cybereason Defense
Platform | Al-driven security to detect,
expose, and respond to
threats | By request | cybereason.com/platform |
| Cycode | Cycode | Supply chain security | By request | cycode.com |
| | PREVENT | Attack surface management | | darktrace.com/products/prevent |
| Darktrace | DETECT | Threat detection | Trial period | darktrace.com/products/detect |
| | RESPOND | Preemptive cyber attack response | | darktrace.com/products/respond |
| Deepfactor | Deepfactor Developer
Security | Vulnerability, supply chain
risk, and compliance violation
discovery and resolution | By request | deepfactor.io |
| Digital.ai | Application Security | Application monitoring and protection | By request | digital.ai/products/application-security |
| DigitalStakeout | DigitalStakeout | OSINT data analysis and alerting platform | By request | digitalstakeout.com/platform |
| DXC Technology | Cyber Defense | Attack detection, response, and remediation | By request | dxc.com/us/en/services/security/cyber-
defense |
| Edgescan | Sm art Vulnerability
Managem ent Platform | Full-stack coverage and attack surface management | By request | edgescan.com /platform |
| Elastic | Elastic Cloud | Security, observability, and enterprise search | Trial period | elastic.co/cloud |
| | PROTECT Platform | Cybersecurity ecosystem | Trial period | eset.com/us/business/protect-platform |
| ESET | ESET Cyber Security | Cybersecurity protection for m acOS | | eset.com/us/home/cyber-security |
| ExtraHop | Reveal (X) 360 | SaaS-based network
detection and response | Trial period | extrahop.com/products/cloud/how-it-
works |
| | DDoSHybrid Defender | Network and application DDoSprotection | By request | f5.com/products/security/ddos-hybrid-
defender |
| F5 | Distributed Cloud DDoS
Mitigation | Network, SSL, and
application-targeted attack
detection and mitigation | Free tier | f5.com/cloud/products/I3-and-I7-ddos-
attack-mitigation |
| | Distributed Cloud WAF | Distributed web application protection | | f5.com/cloud/products/distributed-
cloud-waf |
| | Distributed Cloud API
Security | Data leak and API protection | By request | f5.com/cloud/products/api-security |
| Fastly | Next-Gen WAF | Application and API protection and security | By request | fastly.com/products/web-application-
api-protection |
| Fidelis Cybersecurity | Fidelis Elevate Platform | Active extended detection and response | By request | ifdelissecurity.com/platforms/elevate |
| | Fidelis Halo | Cloud security and com pliance | Trial period | ifdelissecurity.com/platforms/ifdelis-
halo |
| | Forcepoint ONE | Security service edge | | forcepoint.com/product/forcepoint-one |
| Forcepoint | Data Loss Prevention | Data security | By request | forcepoint.com/product/dlp-data-loss-
prevention |
| Fortinet | Universal ZTNA | Zero-trust network access | By request | fortinet.com /solutions/enterprise-
midsize-business/network-access/
application-access |

DZONE'S 2022 APPLICATION SECURITY SOLUTIONS DIRECTORY

| Company | Product | Purpose | Availability | Website |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------|---|--------------|--|
| | Alert Logic | Managed detection and response | | alertlogic.com |
| | Core Security | Threat prevention and identity and access management | | fortra.com/product-lines/core-security |
| Fortra | Digital Guardian | Enterprise-wide data
protection | By request | fortra.com/product-lines/digital-
guardian |
| | Tripwire | Integrity management | | tripwire.com |
| | Vera | Secure ifle collaboration and digital rights management | | fortra.com/product-lines/vera#products |
| Forum Systems | Forum Sentry | API gateway | By request | forum sys.com /product-solutions/forum - sentry |
| | ThreatINSIGHT | Network detection and response | | gigam on.com /products/detect-respond/
gigam on-threatin sight.htm l |
| Gig am on | Application Filtering
Intelligence | Application identiifcation and trafifc forwarding | By request | gigam on.com /products/optimize-trafifc/
application-intelligence/application-
ifltering-intelligence.html |
| GitGuardian | Internal Monitoring | Code commit security | Free tier | gitguardian.com/monitor-internal-
repositories-for-secrets |
| GitGuardian | Public monitoring | GitHub secrets monitoring | By request | gitguardian.com/monitor-public-
github-for-secrets |
| GitLab | GitLab | DevOpsplatform | Free tier | about.gitlab.com |
| GILAD | GitLab | DevSecOps | Trial period | about.gitlab.com |
| | CodeSentry | Software supply chain security | By request | gram m atech.com /codesentry-sca |
| Gram m aTech | CodeSonar | Static code analysis | | gram m atech.com /products/source-
code-an alysis |
| HCL | AppScan | Web application security testing and scanning | Trial period | hcltechsw.com/appscan |
| | BigFix | Endpoint management | | hcltechsw.com/bigifx |
| Hillstone Networks | Application Delivery
Controller | Application delivery optimization | By request | hillstonenet.com/products/application-
protection/application-delivery-
controller |
| | W-Series Web
Application Firewall | Web server, application, and API security | | hillstonenet.com/products/application-
protection/waf |
| HP | Wolf Security | Endpoint security | By request | hp.com/us-en/security/pc-security.html |
| IBM | IBM Security | Enterprise cybersecurity solutions | Trial period | ibm.com/security |
| iboss | Zero Trust Edge | Zero-trust data protection and security breach prevention | By request | iboss.com/what-is-zero-trust |
| | Web Application Firewall | Application and API protection | Trial period | im perva.com /products/web-
application-ifrewall-waf |
| Im perva | DDosS Protection | Application layer security | marpenou | im perva.com /products/ddos-protection-
services |
| | API Security | Continuous API endpoint
security | By request | imperva.com/products/api-security |
| Infoblox | BloxOne Threat Defense | Network security and SecOps | By request | infoblox.com/products/cybersecurity-
ecosystem |
| in-toto | in-toto | Software supply chain security | Open source | in-toto.io |
| Invicti | Invicti | Application security testing | By request | invicti.com |

DZONE'S 2022 APPLICATION SECURITY SOLUTIONS DIRECTORY

| Company | Product | Purpose | Availability | Website |
|------------------|---------------------------------------|--|--------------|---|
| Company | | Full-stack secure services | rtunability | juniper.net/us/en/products/security/ |
| | Juniper Secure Edge | edge | | secure-edge.html |
| | SRX Series Firew alls | Network edge, data center,
and cloud app security | | juniper.net/us/en/products/security/srx-
series.html |
| Juniper Networks | Juniper Advanced Threat
Prevention | Threat intelligence hub | By request | juniper.net/us/en/products/security/
advanced-threat-prevention.html |
| | SecIntel | Threat-aware network | | juniper.net/us/en/products/security/
secintel-threat-intelligence.html |
| | Juniper Secure Analytics | Security inform ation and event m an agem ent | | juniper.net/us/en/products/security/
secure-analytics.html |
| Kali | Kali Linux | Penetration testing | Open source | kali.org |
| | BreakingPoint QuickTest | Perform ance and security testing | By request | keysight.com/us/en/products/network-
security/breakingpoint-quicktest.html |
| Keysight | BreakingPoint Cloud | Microsoft Azure DDoS protection validation | Byrequest | keysight.com/us/en/products/network-
security/breakingpoint-cloud.html |
| | Security Operations Suite | Attack and malicious trafifc simulations | Trial period | keysight.com/us/en/products/network-
security/breach-defense.html |
| Lacework | Polygraph Data Platform | Data-driven cloud security | Trial period | lacework.com/platform |
| Legit Security | Legit Security | Software supply chain security | By request | legitsecurity.com/software-supply-
chain-security-platform |
| LogRhythm | LogRhythm SIEM | Enterprise cybersecurity | By request | logrhythm.com/products/logrhythm-siem |
| Lookout | Lookout Security
Platform | Threat detection and data protection | By request | lookout.com/products/platform |
| | Enhanced Cybersecurity | Cybersecurity and em ail protection | By request | lum en.com /en-us/security/enhanced-
cybersecurity.html |
| Lumen | DDoS & Web Application
Security | Multi-vector and mixed application layer defense | | lumen.com/en-us/security/ddos-and-
web-application.html |
| | Web Application Firewall | Web application security and acceleration | | lum en.com /en-us/security/web-
application-ifrewall.html |
| Malwarebytes | Endpoint Protection | Malware protection and remediation | By request | m alw arebytes.com /business/endpoint-
protection |
| in all warebytes | Managed Detection and Response | Threat detection and remediation with monitoring | Byrequest | m alw arebytes.com /business/m an aged-
detection-and-response |
| Mandiant | XDR Platform | Extended detection and response | Trial period | m andiant.com /advantage |
| McAfee | McAfee Mobile Security | Android and iPhone
protection | By request | m cafee.com /en-us/antivirus/m obile.htm l |
| MO/ NOC | McAfee WebAdvisor
FREE | Malware and phishing protection | Free | m cafee.com /en-us/safe-browser/
m cafee-webadvisor.html |
| Mend | Supply Chain Defender | Open-source supply chain security | Trial period | m end.io/m end-supply-chain-defender |
| | Mend SCA | Open-source software
m an agem ent | By request | m en d.io/sca |
| MetaFlows | Metalfows Security
System | Threat detection | By request | m etalfow s.com |
| Micro Focus | CyberRes Fortify | Application security | Trial period | microfocus.com/en-us/cyberres/
application-security |
| | CyberRes Voltage | Data privacy and protection | By request | microfocus.com/en-us/cyberres/data-
privacy-protection |

| Company | Product | Purpose | Availability | Website |
|------------------|-----------------------------------|---|--------------|--|
| Microsoft | Defender for Endpoint | Multi-platform enterprise
endpoint device security | Trial period | m icrosoft.com /en-us/security/business/
endpoint-security/m icrosoft-defender-
endpoint |
| MICLOSOIT | Defender for Cloud | Cloud access security broker | By request | m icrosoft.com /en-us/security/business/
siem -and-xdr/m icrosoft-defender-
cloud-apps |
| Microsoft Azure | Web Application Firewall | Cloud-native web application ifrewall | Free tier | azure.m icrosoft.com /en-us/products/
web-application-ifrewall |
| | n Genius Decryption
Appliance | SSL and TLS trafifc decryption tools | | netscout.com/product/ngenius-
decryption-appliance |
| NETSCOUT | Omnis Cyber Intelligence | Network threat detection and response | By request | netscout.com/product/cyber-
intelligence |
| | Arbor Sightline | Network visibility | | netscout.com/product/arbor-sightline |
| | Arbor Cloud | Autom ated DDoS attack protection | | netscout.com/product/arbor-cloud |
| Neustar Security | UltraWAF | Web application
cybersecurity | Byroquost | neustarsecurityservices.com /web-
application-ifrewall |
| Services | UltraDDoS Protect | DDoS attack protection | By request | neustarsecurityservices.com /ddos-
protection |
| NGINX | NGINX App Protect | WAF and DoS for application and API protection | Free tier | nginx.com/products/nginx-app-protect |
| Nm ap | Nm ap | Network exploration and security auditing | Open source | nm ap.org |
| NowSecure | Now Secure Platform | Static, dynamic, and
interactive mobile application
testing | By request | nowsecure.com /products/nowsecure-
platform |
| | Now Secure Workstation | On-prem testing kit | | nowsecure.com/products/nowsecure-
workstation |
| | NSFOCUS | Hybrid enterprise security and service providers | Durant | n sfocusg lobal.com |
| NSFOCUS | Cloud DDoS Protection
Services | DDoSattack protection | By request | nsfocusglobal.com/products/cloud-
ddos-protection-service-cloud-dps |
| Okto | Workforce Identity Cloud | ldentity and access
m anagem ent | Trial pariod | okta.com/workforce-identity |
| Okta | Customer Identity Cloud | Consumer and SaaS
application security | Trial period | okta.com /custom er-identity |
| Onapsis | Onapsis Platform | Cybersecurity for business-
critical apps | By request | on apsis.com /on apsis-platform |
| | Network Detection & Response | Network visibility for threat defense | Trial period | opentext.com/products/network-
detection-and-response |
| OpenText | EnCase Endpoint
Security | Endpoint detection and response | By request | opentext.com/products/encase-
endpoint-security |
| | MetaDefender | Advanced threat prevention | | opswat.com /products/m etadefender |
| OPSWAT | MetaAccess | Trust endpoint access to cloud and local networks | By request | opswat.com /products/metaaccess |
| OWASP Foundation | OWASP | Open-source security projects | Open source | ow asp.org |
| | | | | |

| Contex XDR Extended detection and
genomes Parametection and
genomes Parametection and
parametection (Contex Contex Co | Company | Product | Purpose | Availability | Website |
|---|--------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------|--|
| Pailo Alto Networks Conserversion By request
prisma Access Derivation Access Perforce Perforce Mobile And weak ap testing
aconnor Mobile Access Perfectiol Perfectiol Perforce Perfection Web application security
aconnor for CUCCD Free perfection perfection Perforce Mobile Application security
Testing Web application security
Acoes Acounter US mobile-application
aconnor for CUCCD Free perfection perfection Protection Mobile Application security
Testing Acounter US mobile-application
acounty vesting framework Open source contracterization
acounty vesting acounter US mobile-application
acounty vesting framework Open source ordefection framework perfection Protection Threat Perfortection
Profeorition Inform ation
access control, and socurity posture assessment
Profeorition Inform | | Cortex XDR | | By request | paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cortex-xdr |
| CN-Series Kubern ets network security Pailabilities intervaluation intervaluatintervaluatintervaluation intervaluatintervaluation intervaluation | Dela Alta Natwarka | Prism a Cloud | Cloud-native security | | paloaltonetworks.com /prism a/cloud |
| Perforce Perfecto Mobile and web app testing
scanner Trial period perfecto/o PortSwigger Burp Suite Enterprise
Edition Dynamic web vulnerability
scanner By request portswigger net/burp/idatard/y Pradeo Security Mobile App Security
Sesing Mobile App Security
and testing framework
testing framework By request portswigger net/burp/idatard/y Pradeo Security Mobile App Security
Sesing Mobile App Security
and testing framework Open source community chef io/toolschef -inspec Proof point Chef In Spec App and infrastructure
prevention Open source community chef io/toolschef -inspec Proof point Proof point inform ation
and Cloud Security Triad period proof point com 'us/products/sloud-
security /esting Qualys Cloud Platform Global 17, com plance, and
security posture assessment,
and Cloud Security Trial period qualys.com /app s/vulnerability-
managem ent-detection-response Qualys SpecterOps BloodHound Ifentify, quality, and
prioritize attack paths Trial period qualys.com /app s/vulnerability-
managem ent-appliance Quest KACE System S
Managem ent Appliance Tristse managem ent
protection By requesti redware com /products/sloud-wal-
ma | Paio Alto Networks | CN-Series | Kubernetes network security | | |
| PortSwigger Burg Suite Enterprise
Edition Dynamic web vulnerability
scanning for CuCD Free ontswigger net/burp/destardly Pradeo Security Mobile Threat Defense Mobility and endpoint security
Tail period Trail period pradeo com/en-USm oblie-threat-defense Pradeo Security Mobile App Security Mobile application security
Tail period By request pradeo com/en-USm oblie-threat-defense Proof point Chef InSpec App and infrastructure
testing framework Open source com multy chefiohoolschef-inspec Proof point Proof point Information
and Cloud Security posture assessment
and Cloud Security posture assessment
and cloud security posture assessment
and electron and response gualys com (cloud-platform Qualys Cloud Platform Global IT, com plance, and
security posture assessment
monitoring Trail period qualys com (cloud-platform Qualys Cloud Platform Global IT, com plance, and
security posture assessment Trail period qualys com (cloud-platform Qualys SpecterOps BloodHound
Managem ent Appliance If system s managem ent. gualys com iproducts/ktack- path-
managem ent -appliance Qualys Coud WAF Service Service managem ent. graw are com iproducts/ktack- system s
managem ent-appliance Reaptind <td></td> <td>Prism a Access</td> <td>Secure access service edge</td> <td></td> <td>paloaltonetworks.com/sase/access</td> | | Prism a Access | Secure access service edge | | paloaltonetworks.com/sase/access |
| PartSwiger Edition scanner by request pontswigger net/burpd astardly PartSwiger Dastardly Web application security
scanning for CCCD Free pontswigger net/burpd astardly Pradeo Security Mobile Threat Defense Mobile application security
and testing By request pradeo com len-USm oblie-application-
security-testing Progress Chef Chef InSpec App and infrastructure
prevention Open source com multy-heflo/toolschef-Inspec Proofpoint Threat detection and
prevention, and security By request proofpoint com/us/products/advanced-
prevention, and security proofpoint com/us/products/advanced-
prevention, and security Proofpoint Inform ation
and Cloud Security Cloud threat protection,
access control, and security proofpoint com/us/products/advanced-
prevention, and security proofpoint com/us/products/advanced-
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management | By request | rezilion.com /platform |

DZONE'S 2022 APPLICATION SECURITY SOLUTIONS DIRECTORY

| Company | Product | Purpose | Availability | Website |
|---------------------|---|--|--------------|---|
| RSA Security | ID Plus | Cloud-based identity and access m an agem ent | Trial period | rsa.com/products/id-plus |
| KSA Security | SecurID | On-prem ises identity and access m an agem ent | By request | rsa.com /products/securid |
| Scribe Security | Scribe Platform | End-to-end software supply chain security | Free tier | scribesecurity.com |
| Secure Code Warrior | SCW Built Integrations | Security training for developers | By request | securecodewarrior.com/product/
integrations |
| Security Compass | SD Elements | Software threat modeling | By request | securitycom pass.com /sdelem ents |
| Security Innovation | CMD+CTRL Base Cam p | Software application security training | By request | securityinnovation.com/training |
| Securonix | Next-Generation SIEM | Analytics-based SIEM | By request | securonix.com/products/next-
generation-siem |
| | Open XDR | Extended detection and response | Byrequest | securonix.com/products/extended-
detection-response |
| SentinelOne | Singularity XDR | End-to-end enterprise
visibility, protection, and
response | By request | sentinelone.com/platform |
| ServiceNow | Security Operations | SOAR and risk-based vulnerability management | By request | servicenow.com/products/security-
operations.html |
| SiteLock | SiteLock | Website security and monitoring | By request | sitelock.com |
| | Network Security
Manager | Firew all m anagem ent | By request | sonicwall.com/products/management-
and-reporting/network-security-manager |
| SonicWall | Capture ATP | Cloud-based, multi-engine
sandbox for threat detection | Sandbox | sonicwall.com/products/capture-
advanced-threat-protection |
| | Cloud Edge Secure
Access | Zero-trust and least privilege security | By request | sonicwall.com/products/cloud-edge-
secure-access |
| Sophos | Managed Detection and
Response | Cybersecurity-as-a-Service | Trial period | sophos.com /en-us |
| SPIFFE | Secure Prroduction
Identity Fram ework for
Everyone | Universal identity control plane for distributed systems | Open source | spiffe.io |
| | Splunk Enterprise
Security | Analytics-driven SIEM for threat detection and response | | splunk.com/en_us/products/enterprise-
security.html |
| Splunk | Splunk SOAR | Security orchestration, automation, and response | Trial period | splunk.com/en_us/products/splunk-
security-orchestration-and-automation.
html |
| | EdgeSSL | SSL m anagem ent and perform ance | | stackpath.com/products/edgessl |
| StackPath | SP // Web Application
Firewall | WAF | By request | stackpath.com/products/waf |
| Sucuri | Website Firewall (WAF) | Website protection from hacks and attacks | Trial a 1 | sucuri.net/website-ifrewall |
| | Website Security
Platform | Website m alware rem oval and protection | Trial period | sucuri.net/website-security-platform |
| Synopsys | Application Security | Application software security | By request | synopsys.com/software-integrity.html |
| Tenable | Tenable One | Exposure management
platform | By request | tenable.com/products/tenable-one |

| Company | Product | Purpose | Availability | Website |
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| Thales | Data Protection Solutions | Data protection and com pliance | By request | cpl.thalesgroup.com/data-protection |
| | Access Management | Identity and access
m anagem ent | Trial period | cpl.thalesgroup.com/access-
m anagem ent |
| The Update
Fram ework | TUF | Fram ework for securing software update systems | Open source | theupdatefram ework.io |
| Threat Stack | Cloud Security Platform | Cloud-native workload
compliance and security
access | By request | threatstack.com/cloud-security-
platform |
| Trend Micro | Trend Micro One | Cybersecurity platform | By request | trendmicro.com/en_us/business/
products/one-platform.html |
| UBIKA | UBIKA | Web app and API security | By request | ubikasec.com |
| UpGuard | UpGuard BreachSight | Attack surface managem ent | Trial period | upguard.com/product/breachsight |
| | CyberResearch | Managed third-party risk and data leak protection | | upguard.com/product/cyberresearch |
| | UpGuard Vendor Risk | Third-party risk management | | upguard.com/product/vendorrisk |
| Varonis | DatAdvantage Cloud | Cloud security | By request | varonis.com /products/datadvantage-cloud |
| | DatAdvantage | Identity and access
m anagem ent | | varonis.com/products/datadvantage |
| | DatAlert | Threat detection | | varonis.com /products/datalert |
| | Federal Policy Pack | Data protection | | varonis.com/products/federal-policy-pack |
| Venaif | Venaif Control Plane for
Machine Identities | Identity and access
m anagem ent | Trial period | venaif.com/control-plane |
| Verizon | Network Detection and
Response | Network visibility, threat
detection, and forensic
analysis | By request | verizon.com/business/products/security/
managed-detection-response-services/
network-detection-response |
| VMWare | Carbon Black Cloud | Endpoint and workload protection platform | By request | vm w are.com /products/carbon-black-
cloud.html |
| | Network Trafifc Analysis | Anom alous activity and m alicious behavior detection | | vm ware.com /products/network-trafifc-
analysis.htm l |
| | NSX Distributed Firewall | Layer 7 internal ifrewall | | vm w are.com /products/nsx-distributed-
ifrew all.htm l |
| | NSX Network Detection & Response | Event correlation across
multiple detection engines | | vm ware.com /products/nsx-network-
detection-response.htm l |
| Wallarm | API Security Platform | End-to-end API security | By request | wallarm.com/product/wallarm-cloud-
native-platform-overview |
| Waratek | ARMR Platform | Security-as-Code engine | By request | waratek.com/products |
| Wireshark
Foundation | Wireshark | Network protocol analyzer | Open source | wireshark.org |
| ZScaler | Zscaler Zero Trust
Exchange | Security service edge | By request | zscaler.com /platform /zero-trust-
exchange |
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